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Lisbon NACAO E DEFESA in Portuguese Jul-Sep 80 pp 13-28

[Article written Sep 80 by Asst Director of the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI) Dominique Moisi: "The New Trans-Atlantic Misunderstandings"; to be published in French by IFRI in the volume "New European Security Measures" (Studies and Research series)]

[Text] Is NATO dead? An American commentator, Irving Kristol, asks this question in an article published before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On the other side of the Atlantic, Michel Poniatowski proposes the creation of a European nuclear force that would put the old continent under protection from the uncontrolled rivalry between the two superpowers. Even though they represent extreme tendencies, these manifestations of a return to American neoisolationism and to European neoneutralism are symbolic of a serious crisis in trans-Atlantic relations. This crisis was not born of "Kabul," but the Soviet invasion served to reveal the differences that had cropped up between Europeans and Americans in the economic area (the energy and monetary problems in particular), the military area (the problems associated with the modernization of nuclear forces in Europe), the military-economic area (nuclear proliferation and arms sales) and the political area (the future of "detente" and the Middle East conflict). The agreement concluded in December 1979 regarding the modernization of nuclear forces in the NATO theater could not suffice to put an end to a latent crisis that existed since the war of October 1973 and the energy crisis, among the members of the Alliance. Even though it is familial on the surface, the crisis has not failed to be something new, owing to the geostrategic context in which it is introduced and the fact that it involves both Germany and France.

A Family Crisis

Since the Afghan crisis, the Europeans and Americans, in making their respective criticism, have shown traditional reactions nurtured by previously accumulated preconceptions and misunderstandings. To the Europeans, the United States has been, either simultaneously or consecutively, irresponsible because of the incoherent rashness or apathy in formulating or actually creating its foreign policy. Furthermore, the Americans decide and act alone, demanding blind support from their allies, whom they do not consult. To the Americans, on the other hand, the Europeans seem ungrateful, selfish, cynical and also irresponsible, in their futile adherence to a "detente" and dialog with the USSR at any cost. Historically, the Atlantic Alliance has symbolized the political and military guarantee offered by America to a debilitated Europe immediately following World War II, threatened by the

manifestations of the cold war. Two questions have always dominated the trans-Atlantic debates:

What is the American guarantee worth?

How far does it extend geographically?

The Europeans have made three types of criticism and accusations concerning the American guarantee. At first, this guarantee was considered militarily and symbolically insufficient. On the occasion of the Korean War, when the North Korean offensive seemed to augur the unleashing of a Soviet offensive in Europe, the Europeans pressured the United States to reinforce its military presence and to make it more credible, by appointing an American general to the SHAPE command. The second time, after the invulnerability of American territory to Soviet weapons had disappeared, it was the very notion of a guarantee that was challenged, in the context of the notion of an alliance during the nuclear age: the United States could not be ready to sacrifice Washington for Paris.

The Europeans' third misgiving, which became obvious particularly after the United States abandoned the doctrine of massive reprisals and adopted scaled reprisals, was that the American guarantee would not be reflected in the destruction of a Europe which the superpowers, in their desire for mutual savings, made into a priority battleground for their rivalries: in such an instance, would not submission be preferable to annihilation?

The extension of the geographical area covered by the Alliance has been another leading cause of disagreement among the allies. The evolution of the international system, and the growing importance of the rest of the world to the security of the Atlantic Alliance, and that of Europe in particular, accentuated the artificial nature of a division which has been the target of the most heated criticism since NATO's origin. France, after having attempted to secure an extension of the Atlantic solidarity to areas outside the Alliance (Indochina from 1950 to 1954, and Algeria from 1956 to 1958), feared that the Alliance would lead it to become involved, against its will, in a worldwide conflict stemming from American adventurism. These fears, which General De Gaulle's Phnom Penh speech at the height of the war in Vietnam symbolized, reappeared, to a certain extent, on the occasion of the Iranian crisis, in the advice for moderation given by the Europeans to the Americans. Ironically enough, today it is the Americans who are trying to convince the reluctant Europeans that the security of the West, and of Europe in particular, entails the defense of the Gulf. The main purpose of the red arrows which the French generals drew on the staff maps during the 1950's, and which started in Moscow, crossed Africa and the Near East, and reached Europe, was to convince the American allies that the defense of Europe required the maintenance of a French Algeria. Those arrows have now been replaced by statements from Brzezinski, regarding the instability of the "arc of crisis" and by the Americans' efforts to convince the Europeans that they are the first to be affected by what happens in the Gulf.

Moreover, simultaneity between the international crisis and the crisis within the blocs had already occurred previously, during the dispute in the EDC (European Defense Community) and that concerning German rearmament, from 1950 to 1954, or during the Suez crisis in 1956. Contrary to what many commentators appear to be

claiming now, the solidarity, albeit relative, demonstrated by the Alliance during the Berlin and Cuban crises, is far removed from being the general rule. When faced with a disappointing present, there is always the tendency to laud the past.

Today, as in 1956 or 1973, during the Yom Kippur war, the crisis in the Alliance is a result of the differences that have arisen over problems outside of it (the Middle East conflict, the Iranian crisis, the Afghan crisis).

Except for the obvious differences, there is tempting parallel to be drawn between 1956 and 1980. Suez facilitated Budapest; will Kabul impede Warsaw?

Unquestionably, two main differences make the analogy difficult: In 1980, the USSR is in the heart of two crises, and the Alliance is not so weakened as it might have been in the fall of 1956. Furthermore, the Poles have, up until now, shown a political maturity that the Hungarians lacked.

Such historical parallels are natural and inevitable, and they are due largely to the ambiguities of an alliance between a great power and medium-sized powers whose interests and perceptions, either global or regional, cannot help but be opposed, despite their unity against a common danger.

A Unique Crisis

This illusion of a familial aspect, that has already been observed, owing to the fact that all the "ingredients" of the preceding crises have combined in the present crisis, cannot conceal its essential originality and its extreme seriousness. The evolution of the correlation of forces between the two great powers, and in the international system as a whole, has created a drastically different context, which must lead to a reconsideration of the trans-Atlantic relations. Traditionally, the protection of Europe was insured by the strategic balance between the United States and the USSR. The nuclear superiority offset the Soviet Union's conventional superiority in Europe, at a time when the United States' military potential was global, while the USSR's potential was regional. A twofold evolution has brought this balance into question. Not only has the United States moved impassively from nuclear superiority to parity, but that very parity has been challenged by the considerable progress achieved by the Soviets in the area of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons under the aegis of the SALT negotiations (a progress symbolized by the threat of the "SS-20" hovering over Europe). A repetition of the Cuban crisis of 1962 has become impossible, owing to the globalization of Soviet military potential, with a naval presence in particular, which has accompanied and contributed to the reinforcement of its strategic potential. At a time when the United States, in the course of its Vietnamese trauma, had the tendency to withdraw, and to become "regionalized," with its hopes of indirect stabilization thwarted by the collapse of the regional bulwarks of its security (South Vietnam and Iran), the Soviets made the Cubans and East Germans the bulwarks of its action to destabilize the Third World.

This evolution in the correlation of forces has led to the enunciation of an old question in a new way. Is the explicit contract which was the basis of the Atlantic Alliance still being maintained today, and does Europe still enjoy American protection? What is brought into question by the evolution of technology and the correlation of forces present is not the willingness or the psychopolitical potential

of a superpower to protect other nations in the nuclear age, and to convey to the latter the notion of vital interests, but rather the material capacity of the United States to maintain credibility for its guarantees.

This is a posthumous, but paradoxically ironic victory for General De Gaulle. Events have proven him correct in questioning again the guarantee of American protection for Europe, thus justifying the choice made by France in providing itself with an independent nuclear force. But it was under the shelter of the American atomic "umbrella," and because it existed (with France joining or not joining the NATO integrated military organization), that General De Gaulle could expand France's diplomatic margin and afford the luxury of an independence that was all the more extensive because it was based on the protection guaranteed by someone else. What would happen when the American protection is no longer a guarantee, and when the problem is no longer so much that of expanding the diplomatic maneuvering margin (a French priority) or of making a more balanced distribution of the military burden of the Alliance, the "burden sharing," maintaining maximum political cohesion (an American priority), but rather that of helping, through a supplementary effort, to compensate for the imbalance that has been created?

The independent nuclear forces of France and Great Britain, and the conventional forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, must now be considered essential, integral parts of a defense system which the perception of a common threat should unite.

The negative evolution in the East-West correlation of forces is all the more disturbing because it coincides with a transformation in the international system that may be summarized as follows: The Western countries, collectively, have never depended so much on the "rest of the world" (for energy, raw materials and security), nor have the former countries ever controlled this heterogeneous system which the internal instability of their regimes (a natural instability, stemming from political and economic underdevelopment), exacerbated by the risk of nuclear proliferation and reinforced by the rebellion of the local cultures, has made uncontrollable insofar as their evolution is concerned. This instability gives an advantage to the USSR, a revolutionary power, over the United States, a power in favor of the status quo; although, on an ideological level, Marxism, a product of the West, is a model of development challenged for its uncouthness and its Western origins, just like capitalism.

This twofold strategic evolution to the detriment of the Alliance has occurred at a time when there have been added to the traditional causes of tension and misunderstanding among the allies new and specific causes associated with the defense of acquired interests and of differing views. It comes, tragically, at a time when the unity of the Alliance is more necessary to achieve and more difficult.

A Europe-United States Crisis

Except for Suez in 1956, the trans-Atlantic misunderstandings have actually been traditionally dominated by crises in the relations between France and the United States. Today, the crisis concerns the relations between the United States and Europe as a whole; and, within the latter, the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. This change in the nature of the crisis is one of the potentially more serious factors for the future of the Atlantic Alliance [illegible] only is the

Federal Republic of Germany the leading European economic power: its geographical status as a border country between East and West, its political status always dominated by its division and its psychological status, still marked by the weight of its responsibility for the last world war have made it the key nation in European equilibrium as a whole. The Atlantic Alliance, and European construction, have been responses to the German problem. Germany is a real reflection of East-West rivalry in Europe, and France is an essential card that the USSR is trying to use in order to achieve neutralization of Germany that would enable it to fulfill its age-old objective: the political control of Eastern Europe, whose democratic institutions and economic system would be preserved, but whose foreign policy would be alined with that of the USSR.

During the 1970's a gap was opened increasingly in the special relations between Germany and the United States, a gap which would be too easily explained merely by difficult relations that might exist at present between President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt. Probing more deeply, this gap can be explained by the combination of various factors in time. Germany, at a time when its responsibilities within the European Community, but also within the Alliance (it is aiding Portugal and Turkey) are increasingly greater, cannot fail to become aware of the political responsibilities imposed on it by its economic potential, and of the increased impossibility of being simultaneously an economic giant and a political dwarf. This evolution has been accelerated by the German misgivings about the credibility of the American guarantees and by its doubts as to the future of American power as a whole. This has prompted Germany to assume a "discreetly Gaullist" attitude, as Christoph Bertram put it; and this has been aggravated by the fact that the very process of "detente" has objectively dissociated the Federal Republic of Germany from the United States, and brought it closer, although for different reasons, to the analysis and behavior of France.

To the Federal Republic of Germany, which like France claims the paternity of its origin, "detente" does not have mere political (division of Berlin) and human (the possibility of more frequent contacts between East and West Germany) dimensions; but also an essential economic dimension (50 percent of the East-West trade is assumed exclusively by the Federal Republic). Germany, more than any other Western country, is dependent on the continuation of "detente." There is a parallelism between the German and French attitudes, and a compatibility between their two designs.

To France, the "detente" between the two great powers is the key to its diplomatic independence. A return to excessive tension would force France to select its camp more definitely, and thus to reduce a margin for diplomatic maneuvering that has traditionally been based on the coherence of a discourse which has been voluntarily or, at times, involuntarily, ambiguous. To the United States, on the other hand, the process of "detente" with the Soviets, which began immediately after the Cuban crisis and which emerged clearly associated with the negotiations on arms control, is aimed at insuring the stability of a bipolar balance at a minimal cost and with a minimal risk. The American dependence on "detente" is less than that of the European, both economically and politically, but psychologically as well. An ocean and half of a continent separates the Americans from the USSR. Furthermore, the United States is in the habit of making sudden changes in its foreign policy line

(the "Wilsonian syndrome" so well described by Stanley Hoffmann). These objective conflicts over priorities are compounded by the factors of a psychological nature associated with the advent on the political scene of new generations, whose education and value systems are different. This holds true especially in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, the two traditional bulwarks of the Alliance. In the United States, the European ideal of the postwar period has become gradually dissipated, in view of a combination of several factors:

The advent of a Europe as an economic reality, in competition with the United States, but also of a political ideal the credibility of which has been consolidated with the passage of time;

A decline in the interest in Europe and in understanding it, on the part of the American political elite. Nixon was the last president of the United States to have a real understanding of the international reality as a whole, combined with a deep admiration for a European head of state: General De Gaulle. Today, while European studies are on the decline in the United States, the elections to the White House are being contested by two candidates whose provincialism brings them closer together than everything that separates them. In the case of the candidate Reagan, his ignorance of Europe is exacerbated by the presence around him of an intellectual environment that is often passionately anti-European, comparing Europe to the "Munich" democracies between the two wars. Paradoxically, Kissinger, the European, also contributed to this psychological separation, by insisting on the indissolubility of an association "of interests," and no longer on the common values shared by Europe and the United States.

The moralist America, although that is what most irritates the Europe of moderate Machiavellianism, is also the one which constitutes the best guarantee for Europe. In the United States at least, attitudes are influenced more by moral principles than by interests that are well understood.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the American influence has also tended to diminish among the elite, at a time when the American model appears to be declining as an American power. With the advent of the new generation, the special relationship between the two nations is tending to be accentuated.

The different attitude of Europe and the United States toward the international crisis cannot be explained merely by the increased conflict of immediate interests among the two partners. It also reflects the fact that each country has a tendency to interpret the USSR's intentions in accordance with the facilities at its disposal.

Despite the "nuances" that appear to exist among them (with Great Britain ostensibly assuming a firmer attitude), there is, essentially, a closeness among the European countries that is different from that of the United States. England, which is a priori the weakest country, resorts to firmer discourse, but has not succeeded in translating its statements into action. Contrary to the conjectures of some, Great Britain's attitude can be explained less by its Atlanticism than by the "Reaganian" view of the USSR assumed by Mrs Thatcher. The prime minister's lack of experience is mitigated by the moderating influence of her foreign minister, and often nullified by the opposition of a Parliament that is far more interested in the benefits of "detente" than the British Government appears to be.

However, the Schmidt government cannot go too far in the pursuit of a unilateral "detente," for fear of overtly hurting American feelings, and because it is in a pre-electoral period. The demands of the Polish workers have enabled it to avoid an encounter with Honecker, which the "Polish summer" was making embarrassing for both Germanies. Considerations of domestic policy and a tradition of independence have, on the contrary, prompted France to criticize even more an American policy in relation to which it has, however, less objective reason to become dissociated from than the Federal Republic, which is more dependent on "detente." In fact, there exists an obvious Franco-German coalition, the members of which are mutually reinforced by their criticism of the United States, and simultaneously obtain from their unity justification or defense for their criticism. It is without doubt easy to expose the inconsistencies of the United States' foreign policy.

The implicit discourse of France, despite its individual nature, is symbolic of the Europeans' position toward the international crisis since the beginning of the Afghan crisis.

France and the International Crisis

The French discourse has been based on the following developments: While the United States appeared hesitant and apathetic toward the Soviets' adventurism in the Third World, at a time when, for example, Andrew Young was praising the Cubans' constructive role in Africa, the French showed courage and realism by intervening in Shaba. Today, France is maintaining dialog with the USSR at a time when the United States, failing to give credit for its virtues, has assumed an excessive reaction, in too indirect a manner (embargo, boycott of the Olympic Games) to compensate for its past inconsistencies and mistakes. To the French, firmness and dialog are supplementary, and not incompatible. The firmness is manifested in the policy of the French military presence in Africa, in Djibouti, and it will be manifested everywhere that military intervention of small dimensions appears as necessary and possible. This firmness is also reflected in the formulation of a defense policy established apart from the East-West dialog, and independent of it; which explains why France has refused to become associated with the negotiations between the blocs on arms control in Europe. France's defense policy is one of the conditions for "detente," but it is not one of its elements. Through the modernization of its nuclear forces, the launching of new submarines and the purchase of neutron weapons, France has demonstrated a firmness which, moreover, has enabled it to continue the dialog with the USSR and, for example, go to Warsaw to meet Brezhnev.

Insofar as Afghanistan is concerned, repudiating the fait accompli of the Soviet occupation, France has denounced the "unnatural" alliance between those who, in the name of "detente," tend to underestimate the importance of the Afghan crisis, and seek to continue the negotiations on arms control with the USSR as if nothing had happened, and those who, conversely, seek to punish the USSR somewhere, and thus dissuade it from going farther in the Gulf, yet admitting that Kabul is definitely lost. France rejects this interpretation, because it feels that, although it is impossible to punish a superpower like the USSR, on the other hand it is out of the question to accept the fait accompli of the invasion of a nonalined country, without creating a precedent that is both morally unacceptable and politically dangerous. Therefore, it is fitting to strive through diplomatic means to secure a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. In Venice, on the occasion of the recent

European council meeting, at France's insistence, the Afghan resistance was described as that of the entire populace fighting the invader, and the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops was demanded with obvious clarity and firmness. France also stresses the East-South dimension of the crisis, not merely its East-West dimension, and intends to use the good relations that it enjoys with the Third World and the nonalined countries as a means of influencing the Soviets indirectly. The results of the second conference in Islamabad, if they have not thwarted France's hopes in this respect, seem at least to have moderated them. In fact, the Islamic countries denounced Soviet imperialism and American imperialism with the same violence, in the name of an Islam that is intransigent, anti-Western, but still cautious in relation to its very powerful Soviet neighbor. Maintaining the dialog with the USSR could also mean preparing France to play a potential diplomatic role in the future. Owing to its capacity for influencing the Soviets and for emerging as a possible expedient as soon as a political solution becomes necessary to resolve the Afghan conflict, France could use the precedent of the Paris conference on Vietnam to justify such rapprochement and such hopes.

While this analysis does not reveal the intentions of French policy, one is justified in thinking that, despite its undeniable consistency, the latter suffers from a twofold weakness:

It could appear to be very passive. When the crisis reaches such a serious state, it is difficult to be content with waiting and assuming a position of observation or possible involvement.

The French desire to maintain dialog with the USSR, although praiseworthy in itself, would be dangerous if it were to stem from an erroneous assessment of the correlation of forces between the two great powers, if it were, in particular, overly optimistic or overly pessimistic concerning American potential and protection, and if it had an overly rational, overly "Comtean" view of the USSR, overlooking the ideological dimension of the conflict between the two camps. The negotiating process itself, although indispensable, could prove dangerous if it were to help create the illusion that the two protagonists speak the same language. The mere symbolic fact of going to Warsaw is more important than anything that could be asserted, and it was cleverly exploited by the Soviets as a highly effective propaganda weapon.

The Possible Remedies

To consider that Europeans and Americans have identical perceptions of the threat, and similar reactions to the various crises,as well as uniform policies,would be neither realistic nor desirable. This has never occurred in the past. The difference in interests and viewpoints is inevitable, and is based on the geography, history and size itself of the different protagonists. For example, to the United States the Israeli-Arab conflict is both a problem of domestic policy and an international conflict with regard to which it has a global perception. To the Europeans, it involves only foreign policy, although the energy component of the conflict lends it a vital dimension. These differences in viewpoints should be accepted as starting points which the evolution during the past 10 years has only accentuated.

Every era, in order to respond to the divisions of the time, has had the tendency to create its formulas and to devise its mechanisms. However, no one could make up for the lack of political will. A political difficulty cannot be overcome by

the expedient of a technical mechanism, and the blunder of the MLF (Multilateral Force) plan at the beginning of the 1960's illustrates this conclusion sufficiently.

President Kennedy's "Grand Design" was followed by the formula of "burden sharing" popularized by Senator Mansfield. The common expression today is "division of labor" which presumes a division based on complementation of efforts between the Americans and Europeans, both in Europe and outside the European area; in other words, beyond the territory covered by NATO. Nevertheless, this division of labor is liable to involve different realities. The worst formula would be one that would confine the continuation of "detente" to the Europeans, and the responsibility for defense to the Americans. This formula, which has been precisely denounced by Henry Kissinger, would be the one that would unquestionably enable the Soviets to exploit the Western divisions. The Afghan crisis and its developments brought the Soviets a good and a bad surprise. The bad surprise was, and still is, the resistance of the Afghans themselves, a resistance for which the incidents in Prague during 1968 and even those in Budapest during 1956 had not prepared them, and which has made the Afghan resistance increasingly similar to the Vietnamese resistance, with the significant difference that, while there were anticommunist Vietnamese, there do not seem to be any pro-Soviet Afghans. The good surprise for the Soviets consisted precisely of the tensions and divisions within the Alliance, including the division of labor outside of the area covered by NATO.

The European countries, particularly France and Great Britain, because they are not superpowers, and because they have a longstanding tradition of commercial and later colonial presence, and a better understanding of the local cultures, could emerge in a better position to respond to the potential internal destabilization in both the Gulf countries and Africa. Such intervention requires the establishment of European mobile intervention forces larger than those in existence at present (the Kilwezi operation was at the limit of the French capacity), also calling for better cooperation and coordination of the efforts among the European powers. It would be advisable to avoid the resurgence of the neocolonialist rivalry between the French and the British, repeating Fachoda (in the Sudan, occupied in 1898 by the Marchand expedition, and subsequently returned to the British), instead of uniting against a threat of common destabilization. Such a reinforcement of the European forces of intervention is at odds with the American idea of asking the Europeans to become more involved in the defense of Europe, which would allow the American units or the American materiel stationed on our continent to be used rapidly in the event of a serious military crisis, in the Gulf for example. The two alternatives, which are not necessarily incompatible, are based on two different scenarios. It might be thought that the Europeans are more equipped to cope with situations of internal destabilization, for which limited military intervention is sufficient. In the event of a Soviet offensive in the Gulf, considering the correlation of forces in this part of the world, the American forces would probably be incapable of preventing the Soviet troops from controlling the oil wells without resorting to a nuclear escalation, inasmuch as the United States' aero-naval superiority does not offset the Soviets' local aero-land superiority.

On the policy level (the most important one, since the USSR's military use of its strategic superiority is less to be feared than its psychopolitical use), it would be feasible, in particular, to introduce consistency between the language and action of each of the partners. Considering their respective potential and the present conditions of the Alliance, what the Europeans say is as important as, if not more

important than their actions. What the Americans do is more important than what they say.

The Europeans should not doubt the praiseworthy efforts that the Americans are expending to reinforce their defense or nullify the benefits of their energy savings program by talking ambiguously or in a manner lacking in firmness, that could contribute to an exacerbation in their relations with the United States or their political exploitation by the Soviets. Firm language will be possible for the Americans only if they have the necessary means with which to make their proposal credible. A great power cannot afford the expedient of boasting.

Relating, as is essential, their assumption of a position on the Palestine problem and their potential for a presence in the Gulf and in the Arab world as a whole, the Europeans allow the Westerners to be among the countries which reject the Camp David process but which are disturbed by the Soviet penetration in their region. The European initiative may also have the merit of reinforcing those in Israel who reject Prime Minister Begin's suicidal policy. However, the Middle East should not, owing to its emotional and forceful nature, become the constant source of trans-Atlantic misunderstandings. In the policy realm, a European initiative could appear as a supplement, and not a contradiction to the Camp David process. Similarly, the adoption of strict energy savings programs by all the governments may be the only means of easing this source of tension in the relations between Europe and the United States. France's contribution in this regard is already more than significant.

Which Europe for Which Alliance?

Is Europe doomed to be nothing more than a "regional nonpower" caught between the inconsistency of a diminished protector and the threatening aggressiveness of the USSR? The essence of the issue is political and military, but psychological as well.

In order to adopt a policy that is more firm toward the USSR and more conscious of its solidarity with the United States, Europe should be less dominated by the rivalry and pettiness of its national egotism. Despite the existence of the Common Market for 20 years, Europe, an economic reality, is not a political nor psychological reality; in order to take a stand, it must have values to defend and to propose, and have a positive view of itself. Just as individuals who have not really lived fear death more than others, the European societies seem to be closed within themselves in the deceptive dream of escaping history, if possible, now that they are no longer great powers. Are the European powers, because they have been in the heart of history so recently and in such a grievous manner, taking refuge in themselves, in a state of satiated and satisfied exhaustion?

At a time when a specter is threatening the balance of totalitarian Europe, that of the working class, it would be paradoxical if Western Europe should make itself into a Finland out of deliberate or involuntary abandonment. The Soviet model was only capable of providing the USSR with tremendous military potential; its blundering in the other areas is total. It is incumbent on us to guarantee the necessary means for defending a system which, despite all its weaknesses, has not ceased to be superior. At the same time, the Europeans should have a more clearcut notion of what the United States must do, and lend their criticism a constructive quality. The latter will be all the better received the firmer and more clearcut the language adopted in relation to the Soviets is revealed to be. The Europeans should also

accept the fact that the use of military force might prove inevitable on certain occasions. It is paradoxical to observe the Europeans repudiating a tragic view of history at a time when the Americans, traditionally opposed to it, are beginning to adopt it.

How can the "detente" be divisible, as certain Europeans appear to want it to be, if the threat is global? In an international system tragically unified by an East-West rivalry, and aggravated by the natural instability of the rest of the non-Western world, there is no island that is protected, regardless of what it may be. To use Pascal's analogy, we are all sailing on the same ship, and it would be unethical, and deceptive in particular, to attempt to combine, simultaneously, the advantages of American protection and isolation with respect to the whirlwinds of an unstable world.

The Americans, on the other hand, should not succumb to the illusion that military force (and it alone) constitutes the response to everything, and that it can dispense with diplomatic action.

The "Popeye syndrome," to use Stanley Hoffmann's analogy in describing the candidate Reagan's foreign policy program, is as dangerous as, if not more dangerous than the combination of moralism, inconsistency, superficiality and adventurism of President Carter and his leading foreign policy adviser, Brzezinski, may be. It is not so much the lack of consultation of the allies which is the main flaw in the American policy (although necessary, consultation is always difficult in times of crisis); it is,primarily, the lack of consistency. Nothing could be more dangerous than the combination of guarded European optimism and American pessimism.

Apart from all the uneasiness that the current crisis legitimately warrants, there are reasons for hope. Contrary to the analogies that are often used, we are not living in 1914. War, and nuclear war in particular, is not acceptable to anyone as a normal termination of a diplomatic process. There is no doubt that the progress of nuclear technology and the twofold revolution in precision and miniaturization, which explain the changes that have occurred in American strategic doctrine, have made limited nuclear wars foreseeable. But this involves a strategic type of argumentation; psychologically, the nuclear "taboo" always exists.

We are not living in 1939.

The Soviet leaders, despite their present strategic superiority and all the conjecture about the "openings for vulnerability" of the West, have not had the feeling, as Hitler may have had in 1939, that they have but little time in which to accomplish their plan. The view of a dynamic status quo which dominates the Soviet conception of their relations with Western Europe reflects their own confidence in a universal, optimistic ideology convinced that history is going in its direction. Will this still hold true after the incidents in Poland? The greatest threat to European balance lies in the combination of a USSR which feels its capacity to control its immediate "glacis" [buffer area] threatened, which is a prisoner of its involvement in Afghanistan, and which is confronted with a divided Europe that is separated by the lack of understanding of the United States.

Europe should declare, with all the clarity and firmness necessary, that a possible intervention by Soviet combat vehicles in Warsaw will be the "death knell" of the Madrid conference, and will basically challenge "detente" in Europe again.

Warsaw must not succeed Kabul, with the uneasy indifference and apathy of a mute Europe, before it, too, becomes a victim.

Paris, September 1980.

2909
CSO: 3101

GROWING CONCERN IN SPD ON DISARMAMENT, TNF STATIONING

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 5 Jan 81 pp 22-24

[Text] Chancellor Schmidt must prepare for a new fight with his party: There is growing concern among the Social Democrats that the resolution passed at the party congress on bringing NATO arms up to strength is being subverted.

In the final SPD party session, shortly before the end of the year, the chancellor once again presented his view of the world to the delegates--dangers, crises, catastrophes.

His colleagues, sufficiently accustomed to the government leader's prophecies of doom, listened with equanimity to the status report on Afghanistan, Poland and the Middle East.

So no one paid particular attention when Schmidt, apparently by chance, reminded them of a resolution which he had wrung from his reluctant party: In December 1979 the SPD party congress in Berlin accepted the NATO plan to equip Western Europe with American medium-range missiles.

As though it were a question of taking his hesitant followers with him once more, the chancellor recalled the threat from the East: "They are building rockets over there, and you must be aware that they are aimed at us."

Angered by his colleagues' lack of attentiveness Schmidt persisted: "Have you grasped what I have been saying? I am under no illusions that you accept it all."

The delegates, finally taken aback by so much persistence, were filled with misgivings. They suspected that in his routine speech to the faction the chancellor was in reality preparing the members of parliament for changes in Bonn's foreign policy, which Schmidt sees as inevitable after the new American President Ronald Reagan assumes office.

Above all Schmidt tried to get one thing across to the party: The hope that negotiations about arms controls between the superpowers could limit or even prevent the stationing of medium-range nuclear weapons on FRG soil has now proved to be a vain one, 1 year after the NATO resolution in Brussels.

The chancellor is well aware of the predicament he could be in by the end of 1983, when the first Pershing-2 missiles are delivered to American troops in the FRG: On the one hand the Americans will not let the Bonn government go back on its consent to the stationing of the missiles. But if there are no serious negotiations between Washington and Moscow about the new weapons, the SPD--on the other hand--will no longer feel bound by its agreement.

In Berlin the party members had agreed to the storage of European strategic weapons only on three conditions:

--there should be no "exclusive stationing on German soil;"

--the SALT II treaty on the limitation of intercontinental nuclear weapons would have to be ratified "immediately;"

--disarmament talks would have to be given "political priority."

Willy Brandt promised the delegates that he would personally see to it that the government carried out the resolution: "The party," the SPD leader said at the time, "will follow this process, follow it attentively, I am sure. I, at least, will be among those who will follow it attentively and critically."

The party's first condition seems to have been fulfilled. Although it is becoming less probable that Belgium and the Netherlands will participate, Italy and Great Britain are already preparing to receive the cruise missiles. The Social Democrats' second measure was worthless as soon as it was stipulated--in the United States the SALT II treaty no longer had any chance of being ratified in December 1979. But the party leaders quickly found an excuse to get out of the awkward situation in which they had landed themselves. It was sufficient, Schmidt and Brandt declared with one voice, if the two world powers acted "as if" the SALT treaty were in force.

The time has not yet expired for the fulfillment of the last and most important condition--discussions about arms control. But while the technical preparations for the stationing of the new weapons systems are going ahead, the discussions which are supposed to render them superfluous have again been broken off in the exploratory stage.

"Time is passing, everyone is getting grey hair," is the worried reaction of Peter Manning, senior SPD man in the subcommittee on disarmament. Even Brandt has little hope: "The probability is increasing that the room for negotiations is not only being cut short but also narrowed down. This increases the probability that the resolution will go into effect," he said.

During his visit to Washington in November Schmidt obtained Reagan's promise that the new American administration will seek a dialogue with Moscow. But the chancellor is afraid that fine words are worth very little.

The first decisions of the president-elect point in another direction: Bonn is worried that, with Alexander Haig, Reagan is appointing a man as secretary of state who sees disarmament negotiations only as a Soviet snare, set out to trap the West. The designated head of the U.S. disarmament agency, Lt Gen Edward Rowny, qualified for his job with Reagan principally because he left a SALT delegation under protest, because, in his opinion, it was negotiating too weakly.

In addition, a list of measures was announced last week which Reagan's defense experts were presenting to their leader. According to this list, disarmament negotiations will be frozen until the United States has achieved a "margin of safety"--a delicate circumlocution for its intention to reestablish military superiority.

Willy Brandt even suspects that the Americans were unwilling from the very beginning to come to a serious arrangement with the Soviets: "The double resolution in Brussels has been understood from the start somewhat differently in America than by many in Europe." Interpreted this means: Washington saw in the offer to Moscow to negotiate only a means of obtaining an agreement from the Europeans.

Schmidt can easily figure out what will happen in his party if his colleagues have the feeling that they have been duped. Public promises, financial problems with the Tornado and the wrangling about the increase in the defense budget have already created an explosive mood in the party. According to the deputy chairman of the defense committee, Erwin Horn, it could "vent itself in other questions of defense policy" at any time.

There is already some movement in the party ranks. New parliamentary delegate Guenther Schlatter, chairman of the high-membership SPD Mittelrhein district, said: "The party is becoming aware that the price which it asked for its agreement on the NATO resolution is politically not collectible. Naturally, many of our colleagues are asking what's going on?" The SPD leader in the Saarland, Oskar Lafontaine, is announcing a broad discussion on disarmament "at all levels" for this year: "Nowhere does it say that we have to participate in the arms spiral just because the Americans ask us to."

The mayor of Saarbruecken quarreled with Schmidt in the party council after the coalition negotiations, when the latter justified increased defense expenditures with the need to preserve the military balance between the two powers. Lafontaine's comment was: "Balance cannot mean a rocket on every rooftop."

In February the Young Socialists intend to hold a congress on disarmament. Among the speakers: Bundestag member Gerhard Schroeder, until recently Juso leader and opponent of the NATO resolution in Berlin. His question to the chancellor was: "If Lambsdorff were to determine economic policy and Reagan foreign policy, would we not have reached the point where we have to ask why we are in the government at all?"

"Things are stirring everywhere," was the observation of the top SPD Member on the committee on foreign affairs, Karsten Voigt: "Anyone who thinks that the party has accepted the medium-range weapons is greatly mistaken."

One person, who is left unmoved by the Social Democrats' crisis of conscience, has recognized the dangerous turbulence in which Schmidt could find himself because of his colleagues: FDP Minister for Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Not only can he "not understand at all" the Social Democrats' doubts concerning the wisdom of the NATO double resolution, he also considers them dangerous to the continued existence of the government alliance. The security-conscious Schmidt-deputy says: "If there is a dispute among the SPD, I am standing firm."

Genscher suspects that there are clearly some among the Social Democrats who are exaggerating the matter of additional arms into a "symbolic question" with the intention of "calling Schmidt to task." According to Genscher the NATO resolution is completely justified in the light of the international situation. If there is petty arguing going on in the SPD, it is only in order "to bring Schmidt down. They must consider what they are doing." Schmidt himself knows that he has little remaining chance of ridding his party of discontent. In the months after Afghanistan he was successful in his efforts to move the two superpowers to talk to each other again, and this won the admiration of even those colleagues who are not normally well disposed toward him.

He does not believe that he can once more hold up the tiny flag of detente between the superpowers. An advisor to the chancellor said: "The pressure for solidarity from the Americans is increasing, and our potential for objection is exhausted."

Reagan's people see the chancellor's predicament, but they do not want to yield. At a meeting of the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in mid-December, Harvard Prof Richard Pipes, an advisor in Reagan's transition team, said: "We can fully understand, if Schmidt takes account of domestic political currents."

But, the Reagan man added, the German chancellor should "carefully consider whose pressure he can resist longer: that of his party at home or that of the United States."

9581
CSO: 3103

NOTABLE INCREASE IN DEFENSE BUDGET FOR 1981

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 6 Jan 81 p 4

[Article by Sergio Pardera: "More Being Spent (and Badly) for the Armed Forces"]

[Text] Rome--Italy's military spending will increase considerably this year, contrary to all the speeches made on the need to put a brake on the arms race. In the 1981 defense budget, already discussed in commission at the chamber, the expenditure indicated is 7.51 trillion lire, an increase of 1.73 trillion over last year, or 26.8 percent. If we add the "special funds" (1.94 billion) to this sum as foreseen in the finance law, defense expenditures including those allocated to the federal police branch) will exceed 7.7 trillion lire in 1981. The overall increase is around 30 percent in monetary terms, and this is equivalent to more than 8 percent in real terms. Thus, this is more than double the commitments made by Italy at the NATO meeting, which amount to 3 percent in real terms, an expenditure which other NATO countries, in more prosperous economic situations than that of Italy, have indicated they cannot maintain.

The increase in defense spending proposed by Minister Lagorio and the government--this was even recognized by the spokesman for the majority in commission, the Coccia DC [Christian Democratic Party]--is truly relevant. It is all the more relevant when compared with the government's general spending (the increase forecast for 1981 is slightly more than 9 percent in monetary terms, which signifies a cut of 12 to 13 percent in real terms with respect to 1980) and with the national income, since the forecast is "zero growth" for this year.

The imbalance appears enormous and is not in the least justified. In short, we are faced with a worrisome reverse trend occurring on top of everything else precisely when the Italian economy is suffering a serious recession accompanied by growing inflation.

"Despite this massive increase in spending," Comrade Baracetti pointed out in commission, "the defense budget for 1981 does not measure up either to the proclaimed need for Italy's greater participation in NATO or to the need for greater efficiency in our armed forces, and not even to the urgent need for improvement in the real compensation of the personnel (for example, increases in the salaries of officers and noncommissioned officers have already been anticipated for some time in the law pertaining to government employees)."

The most serious lapses concern the lack of financing in regulations pertaining to military housing, reform in military service, modernization in the social services of the barracks, and activity associated wtih the professional, cultural, recreational and athletic qualifications of enlisted personnel. This is not to mention the health sector for which the anticipated budget increase is only 10 percent, amounting to a reduction in real terms of 11 to 12 percent with respect to 1980. No allocation is planned for improvement in state property, service facilities and programing in the industrial defense area, a sector of waste and low productivity.

Minister Lagorio has asserted, even recently, that the efficiency of our armed forces has reached "the limit of acceptability" and that there is, therefore, a need to strengthen both the structures and means. In reality, as now drawn up, the defense budget for 1981 does not solve the problem. There is still too much of a spread, too much waste. The cost of civilian military personnel--particularly in view of an excessive number of higher ranks--is still too high (about 43 percent of the entire budget). In fact, there is a lack of firm political will to reorganize and reform the entire military instrument, while, at the same time, it is difficult to come up with a plan which would include all branches of the armed forces and be capable of reducing waste and increasing efficiency.

Above all, it is striking to note that, in face of an increase of 27 to 28 percent stipulated for the item, "general services and personnel," there is to be an increase of 18 to 19 percent in expenditures for modernization of weapons, facilities and materiel. It is also to be considered that such expenditures are cyclical, that is, tied in with flexible programs. As for "promotional regulations" pertaining to the navy, army and air force, the overall expenditure anticipated for 1981 is 1.577 trillion lire. It is also to be considered that allocations for the implementation of these regulations, concentrated in the first phase of the scheduled "ten-year modernization plan," are now almost exhausted and that the government--this denuciation was made in commission by Comrade Cerquetti--is financing further programs not yet communicated to parliament. It is a serious mistake being repeated in the finance law where Minister Lagorio took great pains to forecast expenditures required for only a few "relatively insignificant government laws," except that of parliamentary initiative, on pensions for death or disability resulting from military service (anticipated expenditure--12 billion lire).

Separate mention should be made of the problem of residual liabilities which, by the end of 1980, had reached almost 3 billion lire, that is, 46 percent of the funds under the control of the Defense Department (in the same year, the state's residual liabilities in general were 11.6 percent). Procedural red tape and administrative slowness are undoubtedly part of the explanation, but there is nevertheless an obvious proximity in the budget's options and orientations.

The communists have therefore pointed out the need for strict verifications and measures which will confront the phenomenon at its roots. Otherwise, what good does it do to plan for a particular expenditure, if it is then impossible to come up with the necessary funds?

The PCI group has fought for profound modifications in the budget and proposed changes in allocations amounting to about 200 billion lire broken down as follows: modernization of barracks and training facilities (50 billion); raising the "pay" to 3,000 lire per day (100 billion); provide the military with access to housing

ownership through legal channels (30 billion); finance regulations pertaining to the promotion of officers and noncommissioned officers (12 billion); and provide 15 billion for the cultural, recreational and athletic activities of drafted youth.

During the discussion on the defense budget, communist members of parliament expressed great concern over the enormous increase in military spending and over guidelines and decisions--beginning with the acceptance of the fundamentals of the Cruise missiles--adopted by the government in its military policy, contending that these guidelines and decisions are headed in a direction opposite to that which the government says it wants to pursue: that of impeding the arms-race spiral in order to strengthen the possibility of relaunching detente.

8568
CSO: 3104

ENERGY RESEARCH OUTLAYS IN EEC COUNTRIES

Duesseldorf ATOMWIRTSCHAFT-ATOMTECHNIK in German Dec 80 pp 619-620

[Article by W. Gries: "State Expenditures for Energy Research in EEC"]

[Text] A scrutiny of the CREST committee provides a general review of the scope and distribution of the state expenditures for research tasks in the energy sector in the various countries of the EEC. Of course, such figures provide only a limited picture of the total research expenditures and of their significance, since the expenditures for the individual special subject areas, which are not included in industry reports, are quite variable. Research expenditures alone are no criterion for measuring their usefulness to a national economy, because only the subsequent technological development and the demand, which is dependent on market conditions, will lead to the desired innovations and their dissemination.

Significance of Energy Research

The intensified efforts to replace petroleum, which have made their appearance ever since the oil crisis of 1973, have to a particular extent resulted in an orientation of general interest toward energy research. The postulate in this respect is that a process of broadly applied energy research will contribute to the development of new sources of energy and to an improvement of existing sources, and that dependence on petroleum will thereby be reduced. However, aside from the problem of defining the term "energy research," there exists no direct relationship between high expenditures for energy research and successes in the form of new products and production processes. Energy research, beginning with the basic research stages and extending to the applied research phase, can lead to workable inventions. These must then be converted to innovations, and such innovations must then be disseminated as rapidly as possible so that the results achieved for a country's economy will become evident. Applicable to the sphere of energy research as well as to general research in connection with desired industrial products is the fact that the relationships between research and innovation are influenced by a multitude of factors and that heavy research expenditures alone are far from resulting in a new products and processes in the energy sector. The desired innovations can only be attained by an interplay of research and development which will contribute to an increase in the supply of new technologies and by demand, which is created by market conditions.

Any governmental energy policy which is oriented only toward energy research and backs it up with heavy expenditures would be doomed to failure if the demand for new energy technologies were not backed up at the same time. This becomes noticeable quite

clearly in the case of nuclear energy. For instance, the use of light-water reactors and of many fuel-cycle installations is presently impeded not so much by lacking nuclear research as it is by government restrictions and by political decisions. The findings made to date in the sphere of innovation research have shown clearly that approximately 70 percent of all innovations have resulted from market needs and that only the remainder resulted from the supply of new technologies. It is for this reason that the new government-level conditions in the sphere of energy conservation and the financial incentives for investments for the purpose of doing away with the need for petroleum via the demand route will stimulate research. However, in the case of major technologies, such as nuclear energy, this not possible. Here one must follow the path of direct promotion of research in which connection, however, one must make sure that the technological development is not prevented by political interference. This development can be seen clearly in the case of the fast breeder. In the case of the so-called new energy sources, and especially in connection with the application of well-known technologies, research stimulation is of relatively little use if introduction in the market place is not facilitated.

Having said the above, it is now proposed to present a review of the outlays for energy research in the EEC.

[Table 1 on following page]

Table 1. State expenditures for energy research in the EEC in 1978, given in Mio. European accounting units (EUA)

Country / Subject Area		EEC (total)	FRG	France	UK	other countries
1.	Nuclear Research (nuclear fission energy)	1,153	398	275	207	273
	Of the above:					
1.1	Introduced reactors	164	-	43	52	69
1.2	HTR	91	82	9	-	-
1.3	Breeders	381	104	96	93	88
1.4	Fuel cycle	316	137	87	41	51
1.5	Reactor and other safety	201	75	41	21	65
2.	Coal Research	197	108	21	46	22
3.	Other fossil energy sources	269	8	95	44	122
4.	Heat supply	172	40	57	40	35
5.	Electricity, Production, Transportation, Storage	138	8	63	36	31
6.	Studies	42	-	14	11	17
7.	Nuclear fusion	134	29	19	12	74
8.	Solar energy	67	12	30	2	23
9.	Geothermal energy	29	3	8	1	17
10.	Ocean energy	7	1	-	6	-
11.	Wind energy	9	4	-	-	5
12.	Hydrogen and others	27	6	4	-	17
Totals		2,244	617	586	405	636

1 EUA = 2.573 DM

State Expenditures For Energy Research

The 1978 state expenditures for energy research within the EEC, stated in European Accounting Units (EUA), are shown in Table 1. In the main, the figures are derived from an EEC analysis. A working group of the CREST consultative committee compiled these data. They are reproduced in this table in an abbreviated and summarized form. In the above-mentioned analysis, detailed data concerning the individual countries are given on the basis of their budgets.

The figures may be considered to be indicators of the state efforts in the various subject areas. In so doing one must, however, take into consideration the fact that the delimitations of the various research expenditures in the individual countries are of a problematical nature. Nevertheless, it is possible to use these data for characterizing the energy research structure in the area of the state.

Expenditure Distribution According to Subject Areas

The total 1978 state expenditures in the EEC are reported as being 2.24 billion EUA, which corresponds to DM 5.77 billion. Within the EEC, the share of nuclear energy research in state energy research expenditures is 51.4 percent. The FRG has the biggest share with 64.5 percent, followed by Great Britain (UK) with 51.8 percent and by France (F) with 46.9 percent. It would, however, be wrong to conclude that state-supported nuclear energy research is carried out to an exaggerated extent.

The reason for this is the fact that financing of research work differs among the various countries. For instance, state involvement in research is quite significant in France and Great Britain, but this is not the case in the FRG, because enterprises in the FRG finance 80 percent of their research work themselves. Since more than two-thirds of the German research capacity is to be found in its industrial sector, a statement concerning the distribution of the state research funds according to subject areas cannot constitute a statement concerning the distribution of the entire research funds of a national economy. In the area of nuclear research, industry's own share is relatively small but, in the case of many nonnuclear energy technologies in the FRG, industry raises considerable funds for research which are not shown individually in the statistics. For instance, the German mechanical-engineering industry has made considerable outlays for rational energy utilization and for new sources of energy without this fact becoming outwardly apparent. Thus, a review of state funds available for energy research can merely be a distorted representation of the total state expenditures for energy research. For instance, if one could add to the state energy research expenditures of the FRG the energy research expenditures of the industrial sector, then the share of nuclear energy would be much smaller than it is shown in the statistics which include state expenditures.

In France and Great Britain, many research activities which in Germany are taken over by the industrial sector are financed by the state, as for instance, in the area of electricity, which is shown in the table with high research expenditure figures. The state expenditures are thereby distorted and the share of nuclear energy research in the total state energy research expenditures is naturally smaller than in Germany. One must therefore warn against carrying the structure of state expenditures for

energy research over to the total energy research efforts of a national economy. This, however, is nonetheless done frequently in public discussions of this subject.

Comparison of the EEC Countries

Within the EEC, there exist substantial differences in the sphere of state support of energy research for the various subject areas. These differences may be summarized as follows:

1. The FRG expends the most government funds for nuclear research within the EEC. Its additional focal point is coal research. These two areas account for 82 percent of energy research funds. For so-called regenerative energy sources, the FRG spends less than France, although its energy research expenditures are higher.

2. France makes its primary energy research efforts in the spheres of nuclear energy, coal, oil, and gas, and the production, transportation, and storage of electricity, as well as regenerative energy sources.

3. Great Britain's main energy research expenditures are clearly in the areas of nuclear energy and coal, as well as oil and gas. For this it spends 73 percent of its funds. Solar energy plays a subordinate role. The focal point of the British efforts in connection with regenerative energy sources is clearly the utilization of the energy of the sea and of the tides.

4. The share of the smaller countries, inclusive of the common research funds of the EEC committee, in the total energy research expenditures amounts to an average of 28 percent of the entire energy research expenditures within the EEC.

Comparison With the United States

If one compares the state energy research expenditures of the EEC with those of the United States, one finds that they are approximately the same. Substantial differences exist only in the structure of the energy research expenditures. The share of nuclear energy in the U.S. state energy research expenditures amounts to about 30 percent (only civilian research and development).

When research funds are allocated in the United States, greater attention is also paid to the demand aspect, i.e. the utilization of the supported technologies essentially occupies a focal point in the measures taken by the state. In particular, the governmental procurement system both in the defense and in the civilian areas serves to introduce new products in the market place. In Europe, this has not as yet been done to a similar extent.

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8272
CSO: 3103

BUDGET CUTS SLOW EXPANSION OF DISTRICT HEATING

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 5 Jan 81 p 32

[Text] Because the Federal Government and the Laender are thinking only of their budgets, a five-year plan to increase the utilization of waste heat has failed.

As minister for research, Hans Matthoefer had big plans: He wanted to cover the FRG with a network of "district heat lines" to reduce oil consumption. As minister of finance, plagued by budgetary problems, technical progress is too expensive for Matthoefer. After Bonn had drastically reduced its contribution for the utilization of waste heat from electrical generating stations, the Federal Government and Laender district heat program was already dead by the end of the year.

Federal and Land authorities together had wanted to invest DM 1.2 billion over 5 years in new coal-fired generating stations with connections for district heating. But Matthoeffer cut the first payment from Bonn of DM 120 million, which was due at the beginning of the year, to DM 20 million. Minister of Economics Count Otto Lambsdorff, who is responsible for conserving energy, shrugged his shoulders and gave up.

That was fine with the Land governments. They are not really interested in new, jointly funded projects.

Thus, for years to come, the FRG is giving up a good chance of becoming less dependent on imported oil. Nowhere else in the economy can energy be conserved on a massive scale and in such a convincing way as in the use of waste heat.

So far, electricity generating plants are among the big sources of waste. Only about 40 percent of the primary energy, for example, of the coal that is burned, is used in the generation of electricity. The remaining 60 percent is lost--as heat in the cooling water--and pollutes the environment. If the warmed water is used for heating purposes, only about one-fifth of the energy is lost unused.

To heat 25,000 homes and to provide hot water year round, 60,000 tons of heating oil must be used if each house is heated individually. If district heat is provided only 11,000 tons are burned.

To the savings in energy can be added the benefits to the environment. The single, tall smokestack of one heat generating station pollutes the air less than many chimneys for individual fires.

In some cities--Hamburg, for example--tens of thousands of dwellings are already being heated with the over 100° Celsius hot water that comes from coal-fired power stations. In Flensburg 80 percent of the houses and businesses are tied into the district heating network. In Berlin the Bewag [Berlin Electric Power Works] electric company would like to supply an entire city district with warm water in a few years.

But not much is being done. "In spite of the advantages for the national budget and the many pleasant features for the user," Minister for Research Matthoefer was surprised 4 years ago to find that only about 6 to 7 percent of heating requirements would be met by district heating. Not much has changed to this day.

The five-year plan, which the Federal Government and Laender had agreed to in 1980, was supposed to bring the breakthrough. But the DM 20 million that now remain in the 1981 federal budget for investment in district heating will now serve at best as an alibi: The Laender will not be able to claim that the state allowed the program to die. Officials in Bonn would like to put the blame on Schleswig-Holstein's Minister-President Gerhard Stoltenberg. In fact, in the summer of last year, Stoltenberg had practically shelved the resolution of the Land economic ministers to share the costs of the district heating program with the state. Stoltenberg wrote to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that the Laender with CDU governments were, for the time being, not prepared to start new mixed financing programs.

The government leader from Kiel suggested that, if district heating were so important to it, the state should donate its share of DM 600 million in the program to the Laender. Matthoefer refused.

So, pipes and connections for district heating can only be financed in coming years with the modest sums that the state and the Laender have set aside in their program for future investments. Eighty percent of these funds have already been allocated elsewhere.

In the next 5 years about DM 10 billion could be invested in the expansion of the district heating network. The need exists.

But the utility companies require state subsidies, principally to be able to build coal-fired power plants. They cannot add all the high investment costs to their prices: They have to offer attractive low prices in order to persuade customers to switch from oil or gas to district heat.

The utility companies have already demonstrated that by themselves they are not prepared to improve the energy balance of the FRG over the long term. After DM 1.06 billion had already been invested last year in district heat plants, interest declined abruptly.

When the electricity producers got wind of Bonn's attention to be tight with subsidies in the future, they promptly scrapped their investment plans: In 1981 they will spend only DM 911 million on district heat networks--and then it will be less each year after that.

9581
CSO: 3103

CANADIAN PROFESSOR: SOVIETS WANT GREENLAND CONSULATE

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 23 Dec 80 p 2

[Text] The Soviet Union and Canada would like to set up consulates in Nuuk. So says a Canadian professor writing in the highly-esteemed newspaper, TORONTO STAR, but this has been officially denied.

Both the Soviet Union and Canada are interested in opening consulates in Nuuk. This was stated in an article in the esteemed Canadian paper, TORONTO STAR, on 16 November. The article was written by Franklyn Griffiths, professor of political science at Toronto University.

The article is an analysis of relations between Canada and Greenland against the background of current plans to ship gas on icebreaking tankers in the waters between Canada and Greenland, the so-called Arctic Pilot Project, APP.

Professor Griffiths evaluates this project as a serious obstacle to closer cooperation in the future between Canada and Greenland.

Soviet Interest

Of plans for Canadian and Soviet consulates in Nuuk Franklyn Griffiths writes among other things that Soviet interest in Greenland has been increasing in recent years. He says the Soviet Union is trying to loosen the bonds between Denmark and Greenland by making applications and offers directly to the authorities in Greenland--circumventing Copenhagen.

"These tactless efforts have been rejected. The same is true of a current inquiry from the Soviet Union to Denmark on the possibility of establishing a Soviet consulate in Nuuk," writes the Canadian professor.

Canada's Interest

Later in the article Franklyn Griffiths speculates on Greenland's opportunities for closer contacts and ties with Canada, especially if Greenland withdraws from EC.

"This has led Ottowa (the Canadian government, Ed.) to ask Denmark informally for permission to open a consulate in Greenland," says the Canadian professor.

Official Denials

GRONLANDSPOSTEN has asked the Danish foreign minister and the Greenland Ministry about this. Both ministries denied that there had been official or unofficial inquiries from the Soviet Union and Canada concerning this matter.

This was also denied by first embassy secretary T. S. E. Jones at the Canadian Embassy and his colleague, embassy secretary Kommissarov at the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen.

6578
CSO: 3106

OFFICIAL REPORT ON 1980 ECONOMY PERFORMANCE RELEASED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Dec 80 p 11

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] The negative economic records set in 1980 dominated the year although the income policy and gradual devaluations were steps in the right direction.

Economic records were set in an unusual number of areas in Denmark in 1980.

The record increase in unemployment and the many other sad records for 1980 are well-known and will be summed up below, but first we should mention that 1980 also had some positive surprises in economic development:

1. Inflation in prices and wages fell off substantially during the year. The latest figures from Danish Statistics on industrial workers' wages cover October 1980 which shows a rise of only 8.4 percent compared with October 1979. That is the lowest wage increase so far in the crisis of the last 7 years.

At the same time the price index has almost stopped moving so that the government's preliminary assumption that two cost-of-living increases would have to be paid out in January 1981 will have to be revised. There will be only one cost-of-living increase and it is not at all unlikely that there will be only one cost-of-living increase to be paid out as a result of the July 1981 price index figure.

The main reason for this positive development is the income policy intervention in December 1979 when the payment of almost four cost-of-living increases was suspended, the price index was set at zero and energy prices were removed from future price index calculations.

Despite the sharp oil price increases and the devaluation of the krone, 1980 was the year in which the income policy first really succeeded in Denmark.

Exports Good

2. Our competitiveness in relation to foreign producers improved 8 percent from 1979 to 1980 according to the latest report from the economic "wise men."

That is the biggest improvement in the postwar period and it is due to the two devaluations of the krone in the fall of 1979 combined with the success of the income policy, see above.

From April 1979 to date the international value of the krone has been depreciated 12-13 percent, with 5-6 percent of this depreciation taking place in 1980 thanks to the soaring flights of the dollar and the pound. The improved foreign competitiveness has had positive effects.

3. Danish product exports have held up surprisingly well through 1980 despite the growing depression abroad. The figures on November exports, just released, show after correction for normal seasonal variations the largest monthly product exports from Denmark to date.

Danish Statistics wrote in its review of 1980 that our share of export markets grew a little during the year. In other words things are moving in the right direction in this area.

Decline in Deficit

4. The balance of payments improved dramatically during the year, not only as a result of the good export figures but also as a result of a sharp decline in product imports.

After a balance of payments deficit of 6.4 billion kroner in the first quarter of 1980--the largest exchange deficit so far in a single quarter--the deficit dropped to 4.2 billion in the second quarter and to only 1.8 billion in the third quarter. In October there appears to have been a small surplus in the balance of payments but for the fourth quarter as a whole there will probably be a small deficit.

For 1980 as a whole the exchange deficit will probably be a little smaller than the 15 1/2 billion kroner we experienced in 1979. At the end of the summer most economists still thought the deficit would be around 20 billion kroner.

5. And 1980 was also the year in which money policy could be eased substantially after being tightened sharply in the first half of the year.

The discount rate which had been set up from 11 to 13 percent in February could be set back to 11 percent again in two rounds in September and October. In addition banks and savings institutions were able to suspend the 10-year-old lending ceiling in November.

Finally, with the passage of the new real credit law by Folketing this fall there came a real easing of the opportunities of credit societies to lend money for construction. Along with the stagnating and declining property prices these new lending rules struck a decisive blow against the earlier expansive mortgage market.

Furthermore, 1980 was the year when the falling stock market switched to sharp advances. Now, at the end of the year, stock prices are generally 9-10 percent higher than they were a year ago.

But the rising stock market simply indicated that foreign buyers were starting to buy up Danish stocks on a large scale partly because they had become unrealistically cheap and partly due to expectations created by a promised easing in taxes on stocks. The market rise does not seem to indicate a decisive improvement in the Danish business climate.

Negative Factors

That brings us to the gloomy record lows also set by the Danish economy in 1980 which dominated the crisis-ridden year:

1. Unemployment rose by around 75,000 people in 1980 and the increase has accelerated as the year went on. Today we probably have an unemployment figure of more than 210,000 (seasonally-corrected figure). The latest unemployment figures cover October when 201,300 people (seasonally corrected) were registered--the highest unemployment figure in the postwar period.

2. The sharp rise in unemployment is a reality despite the fact that the public sector created 32,000 more jobs in 1980 and even though 18,000 more (net) chose early retirement.

Thus in 1980 the public sector acquired 125,000 more people to take care of, whether they were unemployed, receiving early retirement pensions or working for the public sector. To this must be added the regular growth in the ranks of pension recipients of around 10,000 people annually.

3. Tax pressures therefore rose from 44.2 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) in 1979 to 45.8 percent in 1980. In spite of this the national budget deficit also increased by 30 percent, from 13.1 billion kroner in 1979 to 16.9 billion kroner in 1980.

4. Real wages for the average wage earner fell in 1980 by a good 5 percent and private consumption declined by about 4 percent. The biggest decline was in the sale of passenger cars (minus 42 percent) but gasoline and oil consumption also declined sharply as did spending on trips abroad.

Even worse, investments also declined sharply in 1980 with construction and agriculture the "leading" sectors. The record-high interest level in 1980 helped to create the building crisis and the agricultural crisis.

5. Denmark's net foreign debt rose in 1980 from 75 billion to around 90 billion kroner.

Terms of Trade

The buying power of the krone declined 11 percent, corresponding to the rise in consumer prices during the year and Denmark's terms of trade in relation to

other countries worsened by 4-5 percent. The latter means that prices on the products we import rose 4-5 percent on the average more than the prices of the products we produce and sell abroad. The rising prices of oil in particular were responsible for making us poorer in 1980.

All in all these negative factors completely overshadowed 1980 and one can only hope that the positive forces will gain the upper hand in the new year.

6578
CSO: 3106

POLL SHOWS SDP CONTINUES TO LOSE FAVOR AMONG VOTERS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Jan 81 p 15

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard]

[Excerpts] The Social Democrats continue to decline. The result of a Folketing election held today would be the loss of six seats for the party and the total disappearance of the coalition party, CD [Center-Democrats] from parliament. This was shown by the latest Gallup opinion poll. On the other hand the opposition parties would come out stronger and the Conservative Party would become the second largest in Folketing with 26 seats.

The notable decline for the ruling party was found at the very time when the government was breaking off talks with A. P. Moller concerning North Sea oil with a statement that the government would present a bill on new concession terms.

At the same time there has been a heated debate on an interest deduction reform. This debate started in the middle of November and probably led to the sharp decline of support for the Social Democrats in the last Gallup poll too.

Among the nonsocialist parties it is worth noting that the Progressive Party is now slightly higher than the support it had in the election of October 1979, after having gone through a decline in the interim. Ever since the election the Conservatives have had more support than they received on Election Day and they have led the Liberals all along.

The left wing in Folketing has also been strengthened according to the Gallup poll. The communists would return to Folketing, the Socialist People's Party would gain a seat and the Left-Socialists would gain two. In the period when the Gallup information was gathered, from 29 November to 15 December, the Socialist People's Party adopted a new program of principle emphasizing the "green wave" and at their closed congress the Left-Socialists maintained a more moderate line.

BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has calculated the distribution of seats in Folketing on the basis of the Gallup figures. In this distribution the two constitutionally-mandated seats for Greenland and the two for the Faeroes were not included. In

addition we have shown the Progressive Party as having 20 seats today even though its Folketing group actually has only 19 members because Jorgen Junior has become an independent.

	Today	Gallup
Social Democrats	68	62
Radical Liberals	10	10
Conservatives	22	26
Single-Tax Party	5	4
Socialist People's Party	11	12
Communists	0	4
Center-Democrats	6	0
Christian People's Party	5	6
Liberals	22	23
Left-Socialists	6	8
Progressives	20	20

Political Index

Question: Which party would you vote for if we had a Folketing election tomorrow? Information gathered between 29 November and 15 December 1980. Answers are shown in percentages.

	23 Oct 1979	Aug 80	Oct 80	Dec 80
Social Democrats	38.3	38.8	37.9	35.1
Radical Liberals	5.4	4.8	5.6	5.6
Conservatives	12.5	13.8	14.0	14.7
Single-Tax Party	2.6	2.2	3.2	2.5
Socialist People's Party	5.9	6.2	6.3	7.0
Communists	1.9	--	--	2.2
Center-Democrats	3.2	--	2.4	--
Christian People's Party	2.6	2.3	2.6	3.1
Communist Workers Party	0.4	--	--	--
Liberals	12.5	13.4	12.2	12.8
Left-Socialists	3.7	3.4	3.0	4.5
Progressives	11.0	11.5	10.5	11.1
Other parties *	--	3.6	2.3	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Parties with less than 2 percent of the votes.

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WEHNER AT ODDS WITH SCHMIDT OVER SOCIAL POLICY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 13 Jan 81 pp 30-31

[Article: "Mad as Hell"]

[Text] Herbert Wehner's resentment against Chancellor Helmutt Schmidt is growing. He has made a show of disclaiming interest in the chairmanship of the SPD social committee.

Herbert Wehner has puzzled his friends once again. At an SPD Presidium meeting shortly before Christmas, the old master surprised his comrades with an expected withdrawal.

The SPD Bundestag leader said that he intended resigning the chairmanship of the "Sociopolitical Program" working group which he had held for more than three years, and proposed Anke Fuchs, parliamentary state secretary in the Ministry of Labor, for the post.

No one had an explanation for the sudden disclaimer. Not even Wehner's deputy on the committee, Hamburg Bundestag Deputy Eugen Glombig, had been forewarned. Glombig tried in vain to get to talk to Uncle. He was not to be reached, having vanished to his vacation spot on the Swedish island of Oland.

As always happens when Wehner goes it alone, speculation was rife at once. The opposition gloated that once again the deep falling out between Wehner and Schmidt was apparent, and among the Social Democrats themselves there were many who surmised no less hopefully that Wehner, going on 75, would gradually resign his offices and was already preparing for his resignation as party leader in parliament.

"An utterly undramatic event," said SPD spokesman Lothar Schwartz on the other hand; after all, it was generally known how overworked Wehner was. And SPD Deputy Chairman Hans-Juergen Wischnewski said appeasingly that there was no question of Wehner being tired of holding office; he had merely tried "to get some breathing space somewhere."

Wehner confidante Marie Schlei, for her part, was not satisfied with such trite interpretations, saying: "The way I see it, Herbert Wehner has always shown very clear motives in his actions; I can hardly imagine that age, waning strength and fatigue might have been decisive in this case."

Wehner himself persisted in silence--until Tuesday of last week. The circle of people he chose for revealing his true motives was unusual enough--150 clerical and secular dignitaries of the town of Salzgitter who had gathered at an Epiphany reception given by the Protestant Provostship.

After a lecture about "1981 Horizons," for which Wehner had specially interrupted his vacation, one of the participants asked the prominent speaker just why he no longer wanted to chair the sociopolitical working group.

As if he had waited for just such a question, Wehner grasped the opportunity, saying: "you are the first person asking this." So far no one had talked to him about it, "but the press has injected considerable thought into it."

In October 1977, Wehner continued, he had taken over the chairmanship of the committee with the mission of developing a model for a reform of survivors' benefits and for a new orientation of social policy. After the first part of this double mission had been fulfilled, "this very tough job" unfortunately had not been rewarded properly. Crucial proposals of the committee had been vetoed by the finance minister.

This, Wehner went on, had reminded him of a saying by his old King Frederick August when he was forced to vacate the throne of Saxony in 1918.

What Wehner did not want to say out loud, the audience called out to him, smirking: "Wade in your own mud!" Maliciously he responded: "I did not want to put it so crudely here."

The anecdote, told in seemingly jocular fashion, makes it plain that Wehner deeply resents the way in which Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Finance Minister Hans Matthoefer have cut the SPD's sociopolitical plans.

In February 1980 the chancellor, energetically supported by Matthoefer, took apart Wehner's proposals for a social security reform at a session of the party executive in Stuttgart. A few weeks later, Schmidt prevented Wehner's committee from putting its demands concerning labor market and health policy into the SPD election program.

After the coalition negotiations in October finally, it turned out that the finance minister was also placing in question the last remaining key item of Wehner's reform package--the so-called baby year. In the election campaign the Social Democrats had supported a proposal to credit all mothers as of 1985 with one year of education per child in social security. Now Matthoefer is afraid that he will not be able to pay for the additional cost--DM 3.5 million annually.

A possible way out of this: If the new regulation is only to apply to mothers of children born after 1985, the first payments would not be due until the year 2000.

It was this very feint that the comrades had persistently attacked as shoddy in the election campaign, however. Labor Minister Herbert Ehrenberg had said at the SPD election party congress in Essen: "In the Social Democrats' view, it is out of the question to make a distinction between generations of women in this matter."

In Wehner's view, the baby year was "a piece of compensation for what women missed in decades of their active life," and if the SPD did not go along with it, he said outraged, "we will have to be utterly ashamed facing the older women."

Following Wehner's embittered withdrawal, many Social Democrats are now afraid that in the eighties the SPD will lose its headstart in ideas in the very area which has been its forte all along--social policy.

According to members of his committee, Herbert Wehner ceased going along with the excuse that the FDP ministers were the ones putting obstacles in the path of social policy in the coalition. "He noticed," says one social expert, "that the no-men were in his own camp, and that made Uncle mad as hell."

8790
CSO: 3103

HOUSING PROBLEMS BACKGROUND FOR RIOTS IN WEST BERLIN

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 2 Jan 81 p 13

[Report by Klaus Pokatzky: "The Climate Remains Explosive--Senat Makes Concessions to 'Restorer Occupiers'"]

> [Excerpt] There were 16 instances of rocks being thrown into windows and arson of banks and stores, a church and a post office in Berlin over Christmas. A protest against the arrest of building occupiers and their friends but particularly against the housing policy of the Senat. While 80,000 people are looking for new apartments, 7,000 apartments are standing empty.

Kreuzberg has attracted a great many people in the past 20 years--foreigners, primarily Turks, who by now make up 40 percent of the population, or real estate speculators and residential construction companies, which buy up whole blocks only to let them become neglected and delapidated, thus forcing wrecking approvals with a view to erecting new concrete apartment buildings, which are more profitable. And, finally, Kreuzberg has witnessed a new subculture of students, young unemployed, "freaks" and "proponents of an alternative life style" looking for cheap quarters but also intent on jointly realizing their own ideas of life, residence and work. In a novel approach by Kreuzberg standards, they started resisting the Senat's "rehabilitation policy," real estate speculation and the tearing down of buildings.

Whereas the old inhabitants of Kreuzberg, mostly workers and pensioners, in the words of Orlowsky, were "still completely caught up in respect for the sovereign authority of the state" and did not resist the Senat's rehabilitation policy proclaimed in the 1960's, the new generation in Kreuzberg is defending its interests with every means at its disposal. In the meantime the Senat has also learned from mistakes of the past: "razing rehabilitation" is out of date, and rental properties from the last century are conceded their own residential quality. Now these are not simply to be torn down but are being modernized by installing bathrooms, toilets and heating--sometimes with rather luxurious additions such as intercoms and internal telephones.

In the process, real estate speculators and real estate companies have been taking advantage of the fact that the Senat authorities did not really care to make full use of their legal possibilities to prevent residential areas from being converted

to other purposes. While about 80,000 people--families, couples, individuals--are looking for a place to live in Berlin, about 7,000 apartments are standing empty at the moment, and many of these have been empty for years. About 40,000 apartments a year are being "unrented" by tenants being given notice in order that the buildings may be modernized or, if they have been neglected for a few years, torn down.

Disappointed about the lax attitude of the Senat, which even shared in this trend through enterprises of its own such as the Berliner Wohnungsbaugesellschaft (BeWoGe) [Berlin Residential Construction Company] and the Gewerbesiedlungsgesellschaft (GSG) [Trade Housing Company], young people occupied an empty building for the first time in February 1979. They broke open the entrance, hauled in furniture, books and records, dishes and bed linen and made themselves at home. Then another 21 buildings were occupied, the last on Christmas Eve. Half of them are owned by the City of Berlin or Senat-owned residential construction enterprises.

The new inhabitants repaired stair wells and put in new windows and did some wallpapering and painting. In other words, there is good reason for their calling themselves "restorer occupiers." Some actually had an urgent need of a roof over their heads, others wanted to realize their political program. The restorer occupiers do not belong to any group of parties. The chances are they are somehow leftist, environmentalist and proponents of an alternative life style, college students attending to their studies and younger students who have left home, working people who no longer want to live alone and unemployed youths and "punks." Alternative small enterprises, such as taxi collectives, shops and workshops have also taken a foothold.

Most of them would like to have quite ordinary leases and have been negotiating for them for months with the Senat and private owners. They do not trust Building Senator Harry Ristock (SPD) with his delaying tactics. Thus they lived in constant fear of being forcibly evicted by the police. The climate in Kreuzberg became more and more explosive. And the police action on 12 December almost triggered a civil war. A couple of policemen on patrol happened to observe that another building on Kreuzberg's Fraenkelufer was about to be occupied. Half a company went into furious action. A rumor that all occupied buildings were being cleared spread like wildfire among the restorer occupiers.

Some calming words by the senator for the interior or the chief of police might have been able to prevent the gathering storm at that moment. But nothing was done on their part, with the result that in the last analysis the explosive scene was left to truncheons and water hoses. The very same evening occupiers and persons supporting them assembled for a protest at the Fraenkelufer and Kottbusser Tor. What happened then is common knowledge: there was vigorous actions by the police, youths smashed the windows of banks and supermarkets, and there was looting. "There were grannies gathering detergents by the bushel and little Turks swiping candy," the occupiers say. A total of 63 persons were arrested that night, and another 23 the evening of the following Saturday and Monday when things continued on Kurfuerstendamm. All but five were free again by Christmas. But the threat by militant occupiers that unless everyone was released "not only Christmas trees (would be) lighted" Christmas became reality; with rocks and arson, like urban guerrillas, they demolished banks and stores,

a church and a post office. Meanwhile, Saturday before Christmas, more than 10,000 had still protested peacefully on Kurfuerstendamm.

Berlin Senator for the Interior Peter Ulrich now thinks the "best and most reasonable solution" is to legalize the occupation of buildings. The BERLINER MORGENPOST, however, inveighs against the "whole dissolute bunch who have embraced a handout mentality," against the "dropouts of every kind, fixers and ordinary criminals." Those in question, however, do not take either the senator or the Springer paper seriously. It was not only a small minority of militant building occupiers that threw rocks, but many of the peaceable ones lost their inhibitions as well. They felt provoked by a police action which quickly became disproportionate, reaching its climax during the third night of riots when police in Kreuzberg chased any group of youths that had gathered in the open.

The "Humanistische Union" reported that one of its members who was supposed to observe the demonstration had been "flung to the ground" by police, "kicked and finally arrested." Senator Ulrich's press spokesman, Hans F. Birkenbeul, was not ready to rule out the possibility of some officers "hitting harder than they really should," but among the police too, he said, "certain feelings had taken hold--for they too are only human."

Birkenbeul reports that recently at least 25 police vehicles have been attacked by rocks from occupied buildings, "which really is criminal." The restorer occupiers look at it differently. They accuse the police of having engaged in "psychoterror" in front of the buildings for months. Often vehicles with police crews in fighting gear had pulled up in order to create the impression that the buildings would now be cleared, and building occupiers and their visitors had constantly been photographed. "This went on day and night in Kreuzberg," according to an occupier from Luckauer Strasse, who says he therefore had no inhibitions about throwing rocks during the riots.

But he also had flung his rocks into the store windows in Kreuzberg and on Kurfuerstendamm in protest "against that whole consumer crap," in "fantastic fury and hate against that whole system, against all the shit that goes on here." He is 22 years old, used to live in Cologne, became an apprentice there and "for a long time was himself on the consumer trip, with a corduroy suit costing DM 700, expensive photo equipment and a car bought on time." This ceased only after he had moved into a residential commune in Cologne. Last summer he had come to Berlin. In July he took part in the occupation of a building in Kreuzberg's Oranienstrasse--his contribution to the fight against "people being forced into satellite towns, into solitary confinement, against this raising of programed persons without a say of their own."

He does not see a future for himself in the occupation of buildings, however. He would like to get away from Berlin again, because "Berlin is even worse than Cologne, where one could at least scram again." He is now dreaming of a life "somewhere in the country, where I can build up something with people--in an agricultural cooperative or something like that--where I know what I am doing, where I can decide myself what I want to do; not in Germany, though, but in the sought of France, for instance."

The example is not typical; there are no representative types whatever on this scene. Thus the 14-year-old high school student M. from Kreuzberg says in an interview with TAGESZEITUNG that his having "grabbed rocks" on Kurfuerstendamm had been justified ex post facto by the Berlin politicians. What the building occupiers had demanded from Building Senator Ristock for months, and what the more farseeing among his employees had advocated as early as last summer, was offered by the Berlin Senat after the violent confrontations, and even more than that--agreements to put up with the residents of the total of about 100 apartments, substitute quarters for buildings that have to be torn down, paid mediators between restorer occupiers and the Senat administration, government financing of due modernization and restoration work.

"So the actions did some good," says high school student M.; "rocks are arguments after all, aren't they?"

8790
CSO: 3103

PCF: REDEFINING STRATEGY, STRIVING FOR NEW POLITICAL BALANCE

Stand on Union of Left

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Dec 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Andre Laurens: "Does the PCF Have a Strategy?"]

[Text] For the short term the objectives of the PCF are clear to everyone. Georges Marchais and the other leaders of this party do not hold back from explaining that it is necessary first to change the balance of forces within the left in order to create subsequently the conditions for a true change in French society. The balance of forces must be such that the Socialist Party [PS] cannot act as it pleases and pull back, when the moment comes, in face of the extent of the changes to be accomplished. According to the communists, that is what it did in rejecting the logic of the common program in 1977. The accusation goes further back, since the Communist Party recalls that on two occasions, in 1936 and 1944, "a great hope for renovation ended in failure," on both occasions due to its allies on the left.

Consequently, the Communist Party must have "a heavier weight than at present in national life" in order to encourage the emergence "of a fully aware majority grouping" including all those who wish that "that will change" and to renew, on a new basis, the union of the left. It occurred to Marchais to envisage the possibility of a new political accord with the socialists. Nothing more.

Does the strategy of the PCF stop there? Does it go beyond the immediate objective, which consists of strengthening the party and a deliberately vague formulation subsequently?

Questions have already been asked regarding the purposes and sincerity of the attitude of the Communist Party since the rupture of the union of the left. Its positions on foreign policy, the priority given to internationalist solidarity, the rapprochement with Moscow, to many people have given support to the residual thesis of the "foreign party." To others the withdrawal of the PCF to harder combat positions, the complacency with which it has described itself as being a citadel under siege--but still holding out--come from the old and comfortable propensity to live as a closed society, without any other object than to survive. These two theses, which are not mutually exclusive, have the advantage of irritating the communists.

They respond to them by asserting, on the slightest occasion and at the risk of being outbid, their nationalism and by stating that they have not renounced either the union of the left or holding state power. Whatever one may think of these statements, it is necessary to take them into account in order to see to what extent they clarify the strategy of the PCF. If such a strategy exists, it must lead the communists into the government in order to carry out a profound social and political transformation and to reaffirm national independence. The candidacy of Marchais will be framed in this perspective.

The change in the balance of forces between the communists and the other forces of the left, if it has become a prior condition to any real change, does not answer all of the questions which the passage to socialism raises. For the communists it is not only a matter of reestablishing an electoral balance in terms of the socialists which is more favorable to them and of beginning again, with them, from the point where the two parties had been. It is a point of no return, and not only because the common program has been overtaken by events. The very principle of this electoral alliance has been placed in question because as it has turned out, it has not given satisfaction. It is appropriate to find something else, another path, in order not to fall back into the same mistakes and give the leading role to the PS in working for the union of the left.

The choice is limited if, as Michel Simon explains it in a study published in the current issue of CAHIERS DU COMMUNISM, there is no question of preparing for a "great event," either in the form of an insurrection "or in an election, which will collide with a system of evidence even more firmly set in the national consciousness." The PCF is certainly not uninterested in winning votes, which remains an advantageous way of increasing its audience. However, this is no longer the principal line of its strategy.

The passage to socialism will not take place either through the streets or through the ballot box, but rather by pressure at the base of society, by "setting in motion the masses themselves." Michel Simon tries to make these notions more explicit, which they need to be. According to him, a rupture with the system of capitalism, a qualitative leap toward socialism, will not be effected all at once but by a series of changes, "a series of class struggles with a more and more elevated content." It will be an historic process that continues with, certainly, its thresholds and its stages, but without one's being able to program them. The access to power would only be a moment in this process of change, because there is no "advance movement of socialism" which can be granted from above.

The past is not rejected but is considered with all the necessary reservations. "We certainly do not reject the achievements of a period when, on our initiative, the idea of overall change took form and obtained the support of a considerable proportion of the nation. However, experience shows that the method chosen, which did not make it possible to avoid the ruptures of 1937-1938 and 1947, could no longer be expected to let us complete the tasks of today." This was written by Simon, who observes that the transformation of society "cannot take place through agreements at the top level sanctioned by elections." That method is not a good one, but the author is no less convinced that "the aspiration to union for a change...is undoubtedly deeper than ever."

Holding onto old practices would amount to falling into the trap of a representative system which encourages the use of a forked tongue--involving electoral promises not kept--by the right and by social democracy. Even action on the basis of a program has been bypassed by events and is out of style. Let those who are nostalgic for the common program give one reason to the contrary. Not only did this well-known program maintain illusions and confusion "by reinforcing electoral opportunism and the attitude of leaving work to others," but in addition it did not appear to be more advantageous "to enclose the future in a subjective and abstract ledger of accounts." Also, the communist candidate in the presidential election will prefer to propose objectives to the masses: his 131 propositions. Simon refers "to the more and more socialized character of individual living conditions" and speaks, if necessary, of replacing a whole system of bureaucratic government, a whole practice of delegated power, with self-management [autogestion], concluding that the content of the policy of the PCF must "go up" from the movement of the masses. Thus, this policy will be in a position to impose itself on the entire left, and on the socialists in particular.

This strategy is not new. It has often been preached by small organizations of the left, which hoped to get past the cleavages in the French labor movement and to bowl over the large established political parties. By adopting this strategy the PCF evidently gives it another dimension, but is this a strategy which corresponds to its own ideology and to its kind of organization?

Marxism-Leninism has always been presented as an instrument for the scientific analysis of the movement of history, and the parties which claim it as a guide are pictured as the vanguard of the working class. These postulates, if they are not accepted by everyone, permit the communist leaders to formulate with certainty their political lines, which change at times but are always easily translatable into popular formulas carrying hope. Now, in 1980, the message of the PCF is not always understood, even by some militants, and the future of the left seems to be blocked.

A Question

At least there is a question about the strategy, as evidenced by a debate which also appears in the December issue of CAHIERS DU COMMUNISM. We will present some portions of it which throw light on certain difficulties of the PCF. Roger Martelli observes, for example, that "the PCF until recently has had difficulty in presenting in a profound way the problem of the relationship between a vanguard party and a mass party." Jean-Paul Scot in effect questions his party for having engaged in strategic maneuvers, for having taken 180-degree turns, but he recognizes that there could be, at certain times, "modifications in the political expression of strategy, modifications in the concept of union between parties and social forces." According to him, there even was "a necessary modification of strategy in 1936, in 1946, and in 1976," involving, for example, the abandonment of outmoded elements like the reference to the model of the Soviet revolution or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Another participant in the debate, Serge Wolikow, notes that the PCF has moved from "the idea of the transformation of society without a transition period, by rapid, qualitative leaps, placing the accent on a rupture with the past and ending with a revolutionary transformation by extremely rapid stages" to the definition of stages. For the present period Martelli speaks of abandonment of action in terms of stages in favor of the notion of a process. The latter takes note of certain bendings, even changes, in the strategy of the PCF and notes further that in 1956 for historic and international reasons the party did not succeed in giving a desirable new coherence to its strategy. Throughout its history the party has stumbled over contradictions, the brakes winning out over the movement forward.

The participants in the debate in CAHIERS DU COMMUNISM do not question the logic and coherence of the strategy defined by the 17th and 18th congresses of the party, but one is tempted to prolong their exchanges of view by a few questions.

How will the PCF make it understood that it remains attached to the union of the left when it underlines the historic disappointments it has had with it; that it seeks to get a mass movement under way while cutting itself off from its natural partners; that it seriously claims its part in a future government whose realization is put off indefinitely and is not even considered to be decisive?

How can it convince people of its vocation of organizing mass pressure outside of structural systems, of procedures of delegation, of principles of functioning which stick like skin, when it is precisely its own organization which is challenged from within because of its inadequacies in terms of democratic practices and of the role which the party hierarchy plays?

Militant members of the party in Paris say that the orientation of the party remains incomprehensible. Experienced party members challenge a democratic centralism which they know well and the manner in which the direction of the party bends, according to them, the line defined by the party congresses. If they are a minority in terms of the total number of members, they express themselves more openly than ever and at all echelons. The intellectuals are no longer the only ones to raise their ugly heads, and the minor functionaries of the party also say why they are resigning when they go.

Under the best presentation, the strategy of the PCF is not surmounting the contradictions and the ambiguities which it contains. If the strategy encounters a certain lack of understanding, that is because it lacks certain elements or because it is not coherent. The impression it leaves is that of a borrowed strategy or a strategy of waiting, for lack of a better one.

New Aspects of Strategy

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French Dec 80 pp 16, 23-26

[Article by Michael Simon]

[Excerpts] Why a communist candidacy? We will not go over here the arguments of principle which make the presence of the revolutionary element the rule in all political struggles and its absence, even when justified by considerations of opportunism, the exception. The essential fact is the novelty which a communist candidacy represents today (which distinguishes it, one notes, from the candidacy of Jacques Duclos in 1969).

Thinking about it leads one to appreciate much better the depth of the strategic re-statement for which the 22d and 23d congresses laid the foundation. And this re-statement, in turn, is only understood with reference to a national and international situation whose new features make an uncontrolled and uncritical reference to historical precedents essentially perilous: 1917, certainly, but also more precisely with regard to the PCF, 1936 and 1945. To the extent that these references often operate in each one of us, and quite evidently among the masses, in an implicit way, or even unconscious way, they can, as the point of support that they are--and remain, situated in their context--be turned into theoretical and pratical

obstacles. Hence the suggestions which follow and which do not pretend to be anything other than a contribution to our common reflection.

On Some New Aspects for Our Reflection

There is no way out of the present situation except on condition of creating a new balance of forces in the country. That is possible only if, first of all, the struggle is developed. The struggle constitutes, in effect, the first place for an examination of conscience. It is the first expression of the will not to suffer any more. It brings out the collective force which is born of unity. It makes it possible to judge one another in terms of acts and not of words (Who supports us? Who is fighting against us? Who is abandoning us on the road?). At the same time it is necessary to develop a political explanation. All that which remains essential, we have always thought, said, and, as much as possible, done (although the existence of the common program may have very strongly reinforced an electoral attitude of waiting and attitudes of elaving tasks to others). However, these principles are henceforth rooted in a more fundamental view which leads us to reverse the dominant relationship (included, in many aspects, in our own tradition) between state and "civil society," between law and fact, between a politico-juridical change and struggles and practical work "at the base" of the party, between "apparatus" and mass. These principles tend to liberate by this fact potentialities for struggle and creative initiative which are without precedent.

One of the essential aspects of contemporary evolution, in effect--and we have already touched on this point--is the more and more socialized character of individual life: job, salary, education, leisure time, framework of life, etc, are henceforth, in a country like ours, the object of decisions which are properly called political, setting in motion considerable means and involving entire population groups; decisions made by very small groups of "decisionmakers" belonging to the apparatus of the state and to a monopolistic apparatus, extremely concentrated and ramified at the same time. Under forms and with a class content which is absolutely different, a problem of the same order has been raised in the socialist countries.

At the same time, all the conditions for a truly personal life are acquiring, more or less, a political dimension, although not in the sense of the term which refers to a politician. The demand which is rising, and here politics are charged with a very new content, is to intervene in what conditions the life of each one, at the same time that there is developing, although unevenly, the intellectual and collective capacity to do that.

A desire is taking shape to begin to change without waiting any longer, here and now. That is, for those "at the bottom" to be heard, understood, supported, and not to be held in a straitjacket or picked up by "those at the top." This leads to nothing because it no longer corresponds to the state of the productive forces, of social relationships, and of the form of individuality which flows from them (think of the extraordinary broadening of the social horizons in hardly more than a generation). It is a whole system of bureaucratic government, both in business firms and in the other spheres of social life. "You don't change society by decree." We have made this formula of a sociologist like Michel Crozier our own, but giving it its full class significance.

To speak of self-management [autogestion], in effect, also means recalling that clerical and manual workers, taken together, represent 55 percent of the working force. This raises a question about a manner of functioning which arose with the first class societies, which asserts that some people lead (delegating a part of their power to a minority of social "officials" [encadreurs]) and that the greatest number carry out orders. Now, in our time, such a manner of functioning emasculates the immense potential of knowledge and initiative contained in the working class and, more broadly, in what we call the "collective worker." There can be no reconciliation between the individual and his society (and, especially, his work) except on condition of loosening this bolt. Just neglect watching out for this and measuring the still dominant weight of the attitudes of delegates. You will see. However, the fundamental reality is the great commotion which we are trying to describe, and the potential force which it represents.

Free the Movement and Don't Constrain It

That communists belong to this movement is only natural, because it alone provides a basis for the work of democratic change in society in the direction of socialism. First, because such a task cannot be accomplished only by politico-juridicial means. Beyond the fact that social forces are needed, capable of imposing change at the level of state power, a law or an institutional structure remains of little effect if men (as individuals or groups) do not work to put them in practice, above all in view of the sharpness of the class resistance which can be foreseen.

Further, the class struggle is a daily affair. Many are the obstacles to be conquered, and first of all within oneself, when it is a matter of transforming a society of exploitation and domination justified in the name of "evidence" thousands of years old. Finally, and perhaps above all, no one can prejudge in the name of the "masses," organized in forms which have a long history, the priorities which must be established, nor the manner of application which, to be effective, requires conscious collaboration. It is quite evident that the translation of such principles into action poses difficult, practical problems. However, there also, how can they be surmounted other than by democratic confrontation, from which neither tension nor drama are to be excluded?

In any case, this is a basic, supplementary reason which brings us to call on the workers and the people never to delegate their power to general staffs, nor to wait for solutions on the basis of an agreement reached on high, ratified on an election night (after which each one goes about his own affairs). This is also what brings us to break with a programmatic kind of action, and not only in the form of a common program, source of so many illusions and confusion. For if everything depends on the relation of social and political forces established during the struggle, how can one enclose the future in a necessarily subjective, abstract ledger book? Other than in the development of the movement itself, how can one take into account mass creative initiatives whose emergence characterizes any period of change? And if one presents a program ("once in power we will do this, then this, then that"), how can one avoid strengthening the attitude of leaving things to others (we will vote for him, and thr rest is his business)?

Does that mean for the party to disregard its responsibilities and look for illusory compensations in spontaneity? In no way. Proposing coherent objectives, certainly. An articulation of social, economic, democratic, national, cultural

ends and means: of course. However, as it was born of the movement itself, the party should not constrain the movement in a straitjacket of detail, and objectives should not be turned over to the masses like promises but as objectives for the struggle, as objectives for their fight. The objectives should be sufficiently taken over by the masses so that, this time, no one can deprive them of the fruits of their effort. This is the sense of the 131 propositions presented by Georges Marchais: a plan for democratic mass struggle against the present crisis and for change.

Three Conditions To Achieve Change

Contrary to what one hears advocated here and there, the communists will not quickly set on fire what they have adored up to now. We do not reject any of the achievements of the previous stages. The political changes at the level of the state, the nationalizations, the communist cabinet ministers? Far from renouncing them, we are going to do everything in this campaign, and beyond, to raise our demands. The union of the left? In a country as sociologically and ideologically diversified as ours, this is an unavoidable necessity, which even calls for a broader effort (in the direction of the Christians, for example, or, in another area, multiple associative movements and, of course, trade unions and not only workers). The recourse to universal suffrage, the respect for its results, democracy (including in its representative forms), individual rights (including those that one calls "formal" but which guarantee rights which are quite real and extremely precious)? We intend not only to guarantee them but to give them an extension and an "effectiveness" without precedent.

The great systems of balance and the logic worked out in our program, "Change Direction," included in its essentials in the common program, the report on objectives and means? This basis remains, and we have enriched and developed it further in view of developments which have occurred since then.

They tell us at times: the party no longer has a policy. Nothing could be more incorrect. However, the whole problem is that this policy, whose fundamental content "goes up" from the movement of the masses and from the historic roots of the masses (if not, we would really have forgotten our classics), ceases to be "our" policy, to become that of the masses themselves. That policy is imposing itself, in the first place, on a Socialist Party [PS] which for the moment--that's it, the concrete situation--is turning its back on us. It is alined on that, and it is neither an accident in the circumstances of crisis nor a reality surmountable without an immense effort, and on all the parties of a socialist international which constitutes no small piece in the general disposition for the struggle against everything that places in question the world positions of imperialism.

Development of Social Movement

The first condition for such an advance is therefore united struggle from below. From this point of view the problem is not, as often was the case on previous occasions, a matter of addressing ourselves in the first place to socialist workers so that pressure "from below" will make it possible to obtain "at the top" a "good agreement." Experience shows the illusions which such a procedure involves, as well as the fragility of the results obtained. Actually, it would not be too difficult to obtain from responsible socialists, especially at the local level,

"good statements" that would be electorally profitable for the PS and completely contradictory to the orientation and real practices of the same PS. Now, to make this last point clear is simultaneously an absolute duty in terms of the workers and one of the conditions of any political advance. Above all, unity in the struggle (where one can find oneself, beyond political and ideological cleavages, including those with socialists) does not really work in terms of parties or organizations. It brings together those who are interested, themselves, around objectives and in the forms decided on by them. This in no way prevents--quite the contrary in fact--the communists from taking the initiative and playing their vanguard role. Such an orientation is not a state of mind.

We are seeing arise, around struggles for jobs, coal, the various regions, etc, a true social movement which is only at its beginning. This movement limits the capacity for maneuver of the employers and of the government, just as it makes more difficult the preparation of a reformist variant of the same policy. It is loaded with economic, social, and political implications which can turn our propositions into mass objectives, according to a rhythm and modalities which we cannot foresee in detail. Being in unison with such a movement constitutes a considerable advantage for the Communist Party and its candidate, Georges Marchais.

A Display of the Advantages of France

The second condition for change is, in effect, that on the basis of aspirations and struggles there is developing a clear awareness of conditions, but also of the possibility of change. Many French people are poor, but France is rich and its possibilities are great. This is one more reason to halt as quickly as possible the plunder of its material and human resources, their being put up for auction, as Anicet Le Pors writes, by a caste which is concerned only for its privileges and only for its profits. Here again, these propositions, linked to casting light on the responsibilities of management and of the right, are tightly connected to the struggles, from those of the miners to those of the farmers, to cite only those. It is this close relationship between experience and political perspectives which can give our campaign a considerable impact.

The Communist Vote

Finally, it is necessary that the influence and the place of the Communist Party in national life become much more important. This condition is a corollary of the two preceding conditions. Between determination and clearness of mind in the struggle, on the one hand, and a clear notion of class perspectives on the political level, on the other hand, there is a reciprocal relationship. Now, expandion of the communist vote is, first of all, an index of the advance of the revolutionary ideas of which the party is the standardbearer. Winning votes for the PCF is, first of all, winning over men and women to our revolutionary perspectives. It is also advancing our ideas in the struggle among those who, once again, will not go so far as to take that step. Therefore, it is a contribution to pushing the social conscience of our country in the right direction, to the detriment simultaneously of the reactionaries and of reformist ideas. At the same time, the electoral and organizational strengthening of the party, the gain of new positions for it, strengthen the only political instrument on which the masses can count in order to impose, by their intervention and under their control, which we claim, the changes to which they aspire.

To work for communist success is therefore to create the conditions, whatever the situation may be tomorrow, that insure that the policy of reaction will be more difficult to carry out successfully and that the actions of the workers will more often be victorious. It means opening the way to a new, overall advance which perhaps is not as far off as many think. On the basis of the progress of the movement (and not anticipating it) and by watching to see that our efforts help provide clarity and assist the action, instead of favoring confustion and waiting for something to happen, we could undertake the necessary initiatives, including those in the direction of the Socialist Party.

This is, in effect, an essential conclusion of our national conference. Nothing is predetermined: not the present crisis and its cortege of difficulties and misery; not the continuation in power of a political right which is profoundly concerned over the rise of the social movement and over its incapacity to push the party out onto the fringes of national life and with it the forces which recognize themselves in it. In no way fatal either is the orientation to the right of the PS, however much a matter of concern that may be. Nothing is simple for us, as we know. We do not hide any difficulty. However, nothing is easy, either, for the bourgeoisie or for reformism.

The desire for union for a change, which we have contributed so much to build, both before and after 1972, is undoubtedly deeper than ever. That it remains more than a consequence of an immense sea of disillusion: certainly. However, at the same time the signs are increasing of a much more profound understanding of the difficulty, as well as the conditions facing the union for a change. The idea that it is necessary to fight without waiting any longer is progressing, as well as the idea that it is necessary to act--not necessary to dismiss one side and the other, but to weigh each one personally in the right sense.

If the candidacy of Georges Marchais, as we have said, is the candidacy of hope, it is because it is the candidacy of the confidence of each person in his own strength, in his own capacity to modify the course of things, associated with all those who share the same aspirations. It is because it is the candidacy of combat.

Strategy Debate

Paris CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME in French Dec 80 pp 65-67

[Debate with Roger Martelli, Serge Wolikow, Jean-Paul Scot with Jean Dumas as mediator]

[Excerpts] Jean Duma--In these processes involved in the development of a strategy, what is the role for political initiative? I think, for example, of the achievements of the 22d and 23d congresses and what they represent in terms of something new in the general action of the party.

Roger Martelli--It is not easy to pick up in detail, for the period which followed 1972, the way in which the conditions for the development of the present strategy were prepared. It would be necessary to be able to examine with more finesse the relations between elements which were external and internal to the party. There is no question, for example, that the objective changes in French society in the framework of crisis have made changes more urgent and have accelerated the pace of

change. But the PCF is not a simple, passive register of external social changes. Elements which are inherent to it come into it also: advances in the knowledge of French society (especially of state monopoly capitalism), a greater richness in theoretical debate, the weight of political experience, and initiatives by the leadership also contribute to accelerating or slowing down the movements of change.

It is also true that the thinking which has accumulated since 1964, which affected, for example, the Central Committee meeting at Argenteuil in 1966 and the Manifesto of Champigny in 1968, made possible recent changes.

I really believe, in any case, that after 1976 and even more after 1979, with the holding of the 23d congress, we can speak of a new strategic orientation, of a new type of coherence. One could mention several new elements, even if it is done here in a very schematic way.

In the first place, and for the first time in a long time, we have recourse to this concept of strategy, which poses in a more profound way the problems raised by the activity of the Communist Party by seeing them in an overall manner: general intellectual activity, theoretical activity, organizational structures, training of party members, and the development of activity in each sector of society. All that is thought of in integral fashion by recourse to this notion of long term strategy.

Following this, and it is the contribution of the 22d congress, an effort has been made to deepen the very concept of socialism, in the sense of the long term objective of the revolutionary party: socialism for France.

Previously, the party program was concerned with certain aspects of revolutionary activity, the positions of the party on major problems, the intermediate steps to take, but not really the objective of socialism for France. A new coherence has developed today where the delimitation of revolutionary activity in France has been accomplished on the basis of a clearer concept of the object of socialism for France, which ends up, moreover, in the abandonment of the effort in terms of stages and leads one to think in terms of the process and to emphasize in the most fundamental way the development of the influence and the activity of the PCF in that process.

Sarge Wolikow--The objectives in the concept of socialism are no longer opposed to the immediate struggle for democracy, but are set out as the prolonging of that struggle. The definition of the revolutionary objective, socialism, becomes a means for the political battle in the immediate future. Fundamentally, that permits the Communist Party to be a party in the struggle and a party in the government.

Roger Martelli--The fact that one places the objective of socialism at the heart of strategic thinking leads one to think in a completely new way of the place of the party in the process of change and to reflect once again on the type of functioning permitting it to play this role in the process of change. One therefore should not see it as an accident that the 23d congress, which set out the strategy fo the PCF, was also the congress where the statutes of the party were changed in order to adapt its functions explicitly to the demands of contemporary revolutionary activity. This is also one of the first times when all elements of party activity have been consciously and explicitly thought of in terms of its strategic orientation: reflections on municipal activity, practical work in the direction of certain categories, including youth and intellectuals, the very concept of the organization of

the party and its functioning. From this point of view the ultimate developments of such reflection, notably through the sessions of the Central Committee and national conferences of the party, constitute an element of the strategy, a logical and necessary prolonging of the 23 congress.

Jean-Paul Scot--I would like to refer to other novel elements of the 23d congress. Previously, the possible future of a socialist society in France was defined by reference to the general laws of socialism with the addition of some particular national aspects, democratic nationalization of enterprises, committees in the enterprises, and cooperatives. Today the passage to socialism for France is conceived of as the necessary development of the contradictions in French society, by means of the multiform intervention of the workers, in order to master and to administer that new society.

Also, the 23 congress led us to reflect in a different way on French society today. It is necessary for us to know better what this French reality is, with all its contradictory elements, its major aspects which should not be isolated, and its secondary aspects which should not be neglected.

Finally, as a last remark, the resport of the party, with its own history, changed with the 22d nad 23d congresses. In the 1930's or 1950's the party had only one historical and political report, whose limits, changes, and developments were firmly glued to this linear view of the development of the party. Hence, the need for reflection on all aspects of party activity, on the contradictory aspects of its strategic innovations, such as the limits on its mass work, on the difficulties encountered in integrating into the whole party a coherent and overall view of its strategy. Such a need, I say, is worthy of description in the unpublished story of "socialism in French colors."

Serge Wolikow--I would like to make two comments. One often hears it said that there has been a change of strategy. Now, the strategy presently in effect is that of the 22d and 23d congresses. Certainly, this strategy is only expressed politically on the basis of concrete, political situations, and today its application presupposes that revolutionary ideas will advance in the struggle. It is on the basis of these advances that a new and durable people's union could be constructed. The profound logic of this strategy is that of the 22d and 23d congresses. It implies a certain liaison and articulation between struggles for specific demands and overall solutions, struggles for democracy and struggles for socialism. Today this concept is deployed in a positive way, although it was developed in a context marked by the difficulty in leading further the mass movement in France. It was necessary for this concept to be developed in reaction specifically to a cramped and narrower concept of revolutionary strategy.

My second remark is: What does all this serve? Today the activity of communist militants and their capacity for putting in practice the policy of the party pass for a good understanding of the overall policy of the Communist Party. That policy has a basic unity which is necessary to absorb the communists, not to educate them, in addition to their immediate, militant, political activity, but to permit this political activity to be more effective, to permit party members and the party as a whole to be more definitely active on the fields of battle. So that, even in the presidential battle, reflection on strategy will not be a detour. It is an indispensable moment in the thinking of communists and in the very presentation of the policy of the party.

That gives a certain credibility, for example, to our statement that the Communist Party fights for a true change. The notion f true change is profoundly linked to our conception of strategy.

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TWO-STAGE PLAN TO REDUCE TIN IMPORTS EXPLAINED

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French Dec 80 pp 9-10

[Article by Jean Roume: "Tin: 'Savings' Deposits"]

> [Text] This is an expensive metal and no industrial nation can do without it. But it can be economized. The "tin plan" could reduce French 1985 consumption by one-fourth.

All of the some 10,000 tons of virgin tin consumed in France each year are imported. Users have long been aware of their total dependence on an international market over which they have no control.

This "strategic" situation of tin in the French industrial supply picture has received some attention from the raw material savings department of the Ministry of Industry since this department was created, in 1975. Since then, information, incentives and interventions have become more numerous and, as a result, a sort of "tin-plan" has been defined; although it is not official, it has already achieved considerable results which, in the opinion of Michel Clamen--who is in charge of that department at the ministry--could be used as an example for many other metals used by the French industry, most of which are of foreign origin.

Much is at stake. First, tin is an expensive metal since it now cost somewhat over 76,000 francs per ton (the price has almost doubled in 7 years; in this respect, tin is about halfway between common metals and precious metals). Then, the market for this metal is periodically affected by conflicts. Not that the cassiterite reserves are being depleted (they represent some 40 years of the present annual world consumption), but most of them are located in developing countries and tin sales represent a large proportion of their national income.

The International Tin Council, created in 1954, is attempting to conciliate the diverging interests of its members, producers and users, but it has not been able to achieve this permanently. This year, for instance, the United States have sold to it 3,500 tons of metal taken from their strategic stocks to enable it to replenish its means of intervention on the market which were exhausted. Then, Bolivia and a few other producers threatened to withdraw from the organization and to create a "tin OPEC" which would protect only the interests of the producers.

Now, tin is indispensable. This metal has several original properties for which it is difficult to find substitutes. Primarily, it is a "food industry" metal in that it is harmless to man. It also possesses an exceptional resistance to corrosion. Finally, when alloyed to other metals it increases their resistance if they are soft, and it lowers their melting points. This is why it is used in the canning industry and for kitchen appliances (over half the French consumption), in welding rods (25 percent), in alloys along with copper, zinc, lead (bronze, brass, printing type), not to forget a very important series of "miscellaneous" items, from organ pipes and art pottery to chemistry and electronics.

The "tin plan" involved two stages. In the first stage, all the uses, all the methods of savings developed here and there, and all the obstacles to their diffusion were identified. This resulted in the identification of a national "deposit" of potential tin savings, precisely estimated to equal a consumption of 2,325 tons per year.

The second stage, still in progress, involves the exploitation of this "savings deposit." It involves a lot of information (literature, seminars, meetings) and localized interventions in many directions, sometimes accompanied with financial assistance. For tin-plate, to take an example: assistance in promoting tin-free steel (in which tin is replaced by nickel); request for a modification of the standards concerning the thickness of tin coatings, which can be lowered still; incentives to adopt new metallic filling products. These three items alone account for the largest part of the consumption "savings deposit," i.e. 1,660 tons of metal. Already, 1,130 tons have been obtained or work to realize them is in progress.

An additional gain of 420 tons is also thought to be possible if tin-plating workshops are modernized, if traditional soldering methods are replaced by electric or laser wleding, and if tin alloys are replaced by other materials (for instance, coated steel parts could be used in certain consumers' goods instead of bronze parts; aluminum could be used for car radiators instead of brass).

Tin recovery and recycling is especially active in France; each year, 2,500 tons of the metal are recirculated in the various industries. Nevertheless, still greater progress is thought possible if France were given a 200 ton/year capacity for the recovery of tin from tin-plate scraps. To solve this problem, the country must first acquire the knowhow: at present these scraps can be treated only abroad.

Another 120 tons of virgin tin can be recovered from the effluents of plants where certain zinc and lead ores are treated. However, this resource will become available only if the incentives provided by the raw materials savings department result in the discovery of competitive extraction methods. Finally, two or three dozen tons could be saved by modernizing the plants where tin is refined.

A first balance of the "tin plan" has just been drawn. Already now, 1,275 tons per year are being or will soon be saved, out of a total amount of 2,325 tons of savings thought possible. Obviously, the last tons will be the hardest to obtain but, in Michel Clamen's opinion, they do not appear to be out of reach; he believes that they will be obtained by 1985. "It is a considerable saving, amounting roughly to one fourth of the French consumption of imported tin, and it should be realized within seven or eight years and be continued after that. As of now, I do hope that this result will be entered into the "raw materials" chapter of the Eighth Plan."

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COMPANY RECOVERS COPPER, CYANIDES, PREVENTS POLLUTION

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 11 Dec 80 p 69

[Article by Pierre Laperrosaz: "'1980 Clean Technology': A Tribute to Societe Legrand"]

[Text] By recovering copper from the rinse water of electrodialysis copper-plating lines and thus recycling the cyanides as well, Legrand wins on both counts: it reduces its raw material expenses and avoids the costly treatment of effluents.

At the Fourth International Week of the Environment, Mr Michel d'Ornano, minister of Environment and Human Ecology, gave the 1980 "Clean Technology" prize to Societe Legrand (electric equipment) who has installed an electrodialysis system at its Limoges plant to recover copper from the rinse water of an electrolytic coating line.

To do without polluting wastes rather than to detoxify them, such is roughly the philosophy of clean technologies. At Legrand's, wastes would contain 3.4 tons of copper and 3.75 tons of sodium cyanide per year; after suitable treatment, they ended up as metallic hydroxide sludges, the harmlessness of which was not certain, and which anyhow were quite useless. In a few weeks, these wastes will be reduced tenfold, and the installation will permit the recycling of 3 tons of copper and 3.38 tons of cyanide per year. That is a victory on both counts: raw material expenses will be reduced and a costly effluent treatment will be avoided.

Legrand estimates that a savings of 120,000 francs per year can thus be achieved, taking into account depreciation (calculated over 7 years) and the cost of the installation (480,000 francs). The Bretagne-Loire Basin agency is expected to provide 85 percent of the installation financing in the form of a 10-year loan.

The recovery of copper from the rinse water of copper-plating lines is not new, but it was achieved by electrolysis or with an ion exchanger. Legrand has chosen electrodialysis so it can recycle cyanides too. The electrodialysis machine manufactured by SRTI [expansion unknown] operates on the

principle of an ion exchange under the influece of an electric field between a diluted circuit (about one gram of rinse water per liter) and a concentrated circuit (the copper-plating bath which contains 63 grams per liter). The exchange takes place through membranes which allow either the anions or the cations to go through. These membranes are arranged in batteries (as in a press-filter) separating the concentrated solution from the diluted solution.

A Leading Field: Agriculture and Food Processing

A pilot installation has been operated at Limoges for the past three months. It has shown that a recovery rate of 90 percent can be achieved. The final installation will include 23 m^3 of membrane surface area and will be installed on two 1,500-liter copper-plating baths.

This example (and there are more) shows that the potential for clean technologies in the field of surface treatments is not negligible. However, this is not a leading sector. In fact, a survey made by SEDOS [expansion unknown] for the Ministry of Human Ecology, and bearing on some 100 processes, has shown that clean technologies are concentrated primarily in the agricultural and food-processing industries (17.5 percent), chemistry (14 percent), and the paper industry (10.5 percent). Then come the following, with similar percentages: mechanical engineering (9.5 percent), foundry and metalworking (8.5 percent, including surface treatment), the leather industry (7.5 percent) and the iron and steel industry (7.1 percent).

9294
CSO: 3100

ON GETTING ALONG WITHOUT STRATEGIC METALS

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 11 Dec 80 p 113

[Article by Dominique Benasteau: "Strategic Metals: How to Do Without Them"]

[Text] A slight change in the performances of some steel grade may result in substantial savings: first, by making it possible to use less "strategic," i.e. less expensive alloying elements, second by optimizing steel selection so as to reduce the use of high energy heat treatment.

"There are two ways in which we can save: on the heat treatment and on the material," remarked Jacques Ollivier of Servimetal, president of the ATTT (Technical Association for Thermal Treatment), during the Fifth Technical Conference on Sub-Contracting organized by the Lower-Normandy SOTRABAN [expansion unknown] association which took place in November. The main thing is to achieve these savings in consumption and still fulfill the user's expectations.

The objective is to acquire a good knowledge of the characteristics required of the parts to be treated. By making concessions on a performance which is not essential in service, it may be possible to use more "econergetic" treatments, such as those requiring a short cycle at a low temperature. Form hardness to toughness, through corrosion resistance and fatigue strength, not all characteristics are essential. The user shall sort them out.

In an extreme case, a few small concessions may render any thermal treatment unnecessary. This can be the case of dispheroidal (Cu, Ni, Va...) alloy steels. In the as-forged condition, their strength may be of the order of 200 MPa. However, their impact resistance leaves somewhat to be desired. It all depends on the alternatives available. Compared to spheroidal graphite cast iron, they may be more advantageous for many parts.

Boron Can Replace Expensive Elements

Another interesting group: boron steels. In amounts not of a few hundredths, but of a few thousandths, boron can replace expensive elements. However, Edouard Almand, chief engineer of metallurgical studies at the Dunes plant of Creusot-Loire, remarks, "the improvement in stell hardenability resulting from boron additions varies in reverse ratio with the carbon content. And when there is more than 0.80 percent carbon, the effect of boron is nil." In the United States and in the Soviet Union, a whole range of grades are already used. At the same time, low Ni-Cr-Mo steels have also been adopted, such as the NCD2 steels which have been well received in the United States.

Now, savings of alloying elements are becoming more and more interesting. And Rene Labarthe, chief executive of Vide and Thermochimie de Normandie, comments: "The list of materials in short supply is becoming longer! For titanium, scarcity has become endemic. Chromium and manganese are also on the list." It is tragic that, to reduce the consumption of a given element and still retain the same performance level, another element has to be used instead... and it, too, may some day be in short supply. Unless the shortage of the first one ceases! Metallurgists still remember their frenzied search for nickel-free stainless steels--that was a few years ago. After an eclipse which was noticeable especially in the United States, that metal has now resumed its place among alloying elements.

Besides, substitutions may become a headache. "For instance," Edouard Almand goes on, "0.2 percent of molybdenum can be replaced by manganese--by increasing the content of the latter from 0.7 to 1.27 percent." But two facts must be considered. First, it takes 0.57 percent of manganese to replace 0.2 percent of molybdenum. Then, if hardenability is in fact the same, the saying "all other things being equal" does not fully apply. Manganese promotes over-carburization in cemented steels and, therefore, increases the risk of crack formation.

Substitutions Are Interesting For Large Production Runs

According to Christian Pavee, who is in charge of the thermal treatment processes at the Regie Renault's Le Mans plant, "substitutions are interesting for large production runs, because of the effect of mass, but we should keep in mind not only the characteristics in service, but also the reliability and the cost of manufacturing..." This is not to say that the automobile industry is caught in set choices. On the contrary, it is providing examples of successful substitutions which might well be applied to many other parts. A typical instance mentioned by Christian Pavee is that of a steering-knuckle which used to be made out of a Mn-Cr steel and is now made out of a Mn-B steel--really a very promising group. Yet, this front axle part is subject to a lot of stress and, in addition, it is a safety part.

Besides, the requirements placed on that part are numerous: fatigue strength of the arm, impact resistance, boss resistance to hammering... The Mn-Cr steel used until now, 20 MC5, had been entirely satisfactory. Then, as a result of the escalation of chromium prices, boron is being used instead. The 20 MB5 grade, with an almost identical composition, has been tested and adopted. In spite of the difference in hardenability, as shown by the Jominy test, the new grade has proved satisfactory for the steering-knuckle. And the absence of chromium has proved to be a decisive advantage as far as the impact strength transition temperature is concerned. From -20°C, it has decreased to - 80°C, i.e. well out of the service range, even in the coldest climates. The upper impact strength limit of the 20MB5 grade is--for the time being--still somewhat of a problem during machining, especially during broaching. This difficulty, if not already overcome, is on its way to being so.

9294
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MARIANETTI OF CGIL DISCUSSES UNION REFORM

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 16 Nov 80 pp 276-279

[Interview with Agostino Marianetti of the CGIL by Paola Pilati]

> [Text] The number two man of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] does not like Craxi's ideas on the union. Nor those of Martelli. But he wants, for the socialists, the leadership of its remaking. Here are the objectives.

Rome--"I feel that I participated in the errors and insufficiencies of the left. The true left, I mean, the one which may be divided over Lenin and Proudhon, but which is then substantially united. Claudio Martelli thinks differently. But obviously he is not the son, as I am, of the great union struggles of the fifties." It is Agostino Marianetti, the number two man of the CGIL, who argues thus with Martelli, Marianetti who is the socialist of the great confederation with a communist majority. Marianetti has nothing in common with that other union socialist, the leader of the UIL [Italian Union of Labor], Giorgio Benvenuto. While the latter is effervescent, Marianetti is shy and prudent. And to Benvenuto's raids, he has always opposed an inflexible diplomacy and a constant entente with the father-leader of the CGIL, Luciano Lama.

But now that the socialist party has taken back the initiative on the union front, now that Martelli theorizes the passage of the union from "movement" to "institution," now that Craxi is aiming to win over the middle classes (like the "bosses" at Fiat), what effects will this have on the process of remaking the union? Can one imagine a Marianetti side by side with Benvenuto, for many the natural protagonist of the reformed union? And what consequences would this have on the CGIL?

"Craxi's policy, the search for a greater social representation of the PSI [Italian Socialist Party], convinces me," prefixes Marianetti. "But naturally the union cannot make a choice between representing the working class base and that of the other workers. For this reason, we are trying to create a new union in which there would be room for all: even the technicians, the bosses, the intermediate cadres. On the other hand, if we do not offer them a way to express their professional role in our union policies, we will be making the bosses into victims and our enemies." Craxi is all right, but the union is something else. And outside of the united union there is no hope.

But let us see it, this model of the new union, which was baptized, not without conflicts, in last week's united directive. In the document of 66 sheets, which will have as a platform the EUR [Labor Union Headquarters], there is everything: from the more strictly economic part, in which the union extols all the themes which it had often fought just a short time ago (the solidarity fund, the principle of professionalism against egalitarianism, the cost of living index), to that part in which it delineates the new organizational structure (regulation of the meetings, secret vote and referendum).

What will the union become after this innovation? It has not yet been understood whether it is the institutional union of Martelli or the movement union of Ingrao and Trentin which is wanted... "This is where we are," laments Marianetti; "even this alternative is one of those manifestations of the flux which exists in this country: it jumps on somebody and decrees the end of the union of the councils. Somebody who wants to normalize the union: from an 'independent variable' of the country's political game, he wants to reduce it to an element of stabilization. And what does he propose? One one hand, the Peronist model, in which, after having thrown out the connecting structure between the leader group and the workers (without replacing it with anything), one is left with a union reduced to a mere movement. And on the other hand, there appears the model of the union-institution, with the risk of stiffening into a structure which is precisely institutionalized, losing its relationship with the whole of the working class."

To save the union of the councils, therefore, but with what correctives? The traditional factory delegate has already been condemned to death... "One minute, it is not necessary to look at everything as if we were still talking about Fiat, which is a factory with big problems of union governability because of its size, because of the low degree of unionization and also because Turin has grown. Fiat makes history all by itself. The problems which have arisen there are a special case."

Elsewhere, on the contrary, do you think that the union could be led with the old style? "No, but let us understand each other: the delegate with parka and beard, all readdy to shout slogans, has found no room within the factory or within the union structure. For all the others, it is a matter, however, of a role crisis: we are thinking of how they were formed, during a period of economic expansion, during a phase in which the space for demands was much broader than now. When all this collapsed, they felt overwhelmed: even the illusion of being the true interpreters of a spontaneous syndicalism which abhors political mediation has crumbled." A psychological interpretation of the delegate from which there emerges the image of a man isolated, a bit impulsive... "But there exist also the objective reasons for the crisis of the delegates: the union, which is not as they expected it to be. There is also bureaucracy, mediation logic, the effort to give to the proposals a good degree of certainty. For those, then, who enter the unions, becoming their officials, the delusion is double: not only is the union not what they expected, but also the relationship with the workers becomes difficult and it wears out."

Another of the accusations made of the union these days, especially by the socialist side, is one of cultural delays and inadequacies: in what direction must it be brought up to date? "We have first of all technical gaps to overcome, if we want

to really conduct a dialog with the companies, to study the balance-sheets, to consider solutions. But above all we are too tied to a demand and challenge attitude which is now inadequate and leads inevitably to defeat. We must pass to an attitude of participation with the companies and the government, risking even going against the criticisms from the base."

On these subjects, the socialist culture has been precisely the one to be the trail blazer, with Benvenuto at the head of the union. Is the CGIL completely in agreement? "Problems, between socialists and communists of the CGIL, there have always been some: it is enough to say that, except for very short periods, the proposals which came from the communists have always prevailed. Now, if the socialists are the protagonists, it is because these are problems which find the socialist culture more sensitive. But for the moment the entire CGIL is involved, even the Trentins, the Garavinis and the Lamas."

8956
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EUROPEAN, U. S. POINTS OF VIEW NEED CLARIFICATION

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 3 Jan 81 p 7

[Review of Republican foreign policy views by Max Van Der Stoel, Labor Party (PvdA) Second Chamber member and former (Den Uyl cabinet) minister of foreign affairs, after his visit to Washington during transition period. Dates of visit not given: "Europe Must Advocate Its Own Position Before Reagan Really Starts To Govern"]

[Text] Less than a month before Reagan is inaugurated as president, his choices for the top jobs in his cabinet are known, but the policy that he is going to pursue is still veiled. Washington is buzzing with the activities of the transition teams--groups of advisors who are working out options for future policy by sectors and making recommendations for the staffing of positions. Even though these teams themselves must wait to see which of their recommendations are accepted and within the teams there are often differences of opinion between traditional Republicans and ultraconservatives, their approach provides sufficient clues as to the political climate which has gained superiority after Reagan's great victory and the political landslide to the right in the Senate.

A visit to Washington gave me the opportunity to ascertain the opinions of various prominent members of the transition teams who are involved in foreign and defense policy. What struck me then was the deep concern with the enormous expansion of the Soviet military potential during the 1970's, which was stressed time and again. According to the Republicans, the Soviet Union has not only seen its chance to eliminate the American superiority in the strategic nuclear area, but also to build up a formidable threat to the Minuteman Intercontinental ballistic missiles on the American continent, which will become very vulnerable in the coming years. The American fleet at its current strength is said not to be able adequately to face the still constantly growing Soviet threat on the sea, and much more rapidly deployable land forces are said to be needed to provide a credible deterrent to possible new Soviet intervention plans in the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

Internal Crisis

To this sober analysis of the military balance of power is added an equally pessimistic view of Moscow's intentions in the coming years. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is felt to be particularly alarming because for the

first time Moscow has used force outside the area encompassed by the Warsaw Pact, but also because the territory of Afghanistan can be used as a springboard for operations directed toward the Persian Gulf area, which is so vital to Western oil imports. To be sure, serious account is taken of the possibility that the Soviet Union will be confronted in later years with internal crisis through economic shortages and growing tensions among the various nationalities, but it is felt that it would be wrong to suppose that therefore Moscow will choose in the near future to follow a more reserved and more conciliatory foreign policy. The current Soviet leadership, marked by fear of a new world war, is on the point of disappearing; a younger generation very well could fall into the temptation of making the maximum use of the current balance of power, which is favorable to the Soviet Union.

Confronting a Soviet Union steadily gaining in power and influence, so the argument continued, stood an America, which, as a result of guilt complexes raised by Vietnam, was more interested in castigating itself than in trying to call a halt to the Soviet expansion. The Cubans directed by Moscow could follow their own course in Angola; Ethiopia and South Yemen became Soviet allies. President Carter declared the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba, but decided a few weeks later to accept it. But the Republican victory in November means that America will now follow a more resolute and particularly a more consistant line. "We don't want to be pushed around any more," [given in English and followed by Dutch]--we are no longer to be trifled with--those are words that every Republican has on the tip of his tongue. America shall again make itself felt, and shall take comfort in the exertions required to bring defense up to the level considered necessary. In all of that I never heard anything of the Dulles-style "roll-back theories," any more than of a rash approach to the nuclear dangers. The understanding of the disastrous consequences of a nuclear conflict for America, too, is deeply rooted.

Empty Gestures

There is a lot of criticism of Europe. The European countries ought to have reacted much more resolutely to the invasion of Afghanistan; all there was was a few empty gestures. And they reacted to the growing Soviet threat by announcing one after the other that under the current unfavorable economic and financial circumstances they would not be able to attain the real growth of defense spending of 3 percent agreed upon at the 1978 Washington summit conference. They also do not show any interest in contributing to the defense of the Persian Gulf area--a matter of more vital interest to Europe than to America--that is left to the symbolic presence in the Persian Gulf could lead in the long run to a reduction in American troop strength in Europe? And does not the disappearance of the American nuclear superiority, which gave a special significance to the guarantee to Europe, force an effort to reach, or at least to approach, as closely as possible a conventional parity in Europe?

Also striking is the skepticism about arms control, at least for the near future. Arms control talks often lead to the codification of the existing balance of power, according to an often-heard argument. Well, the balance of power is not favorable to us now, and freezing it in treaties with the Soviet Union is not in our interest. The arms control talks certainly need not be broken off, but they

can only become really interesting to us if a greater American military strength or at least decisions about the buildup of greater American military strength promise a more satisfactory result of the negotiations.

With respect to SALT II, it is not expected that the new Republican administration will limit itself in the renegotiations to proposing a few "cosmetic" improvements; presumably substantial changes will be proposed. It is considered equally highly probable that the Soviet Union in turn will come up with substantial counterproposals, and that lengthy negotiations may very well become unavoidable. And furthermore, the word Reagan used after his election was heard again in this context: "linkage". It is felt that it will not do to conclude a SALT treaty while at the same time the Soviet Union is continuing to change the balance of power to the disadvantage of the United States by means of intervention and subversion of regimes friendly to the Washington.

Will these Republican ideas really determine Reagan's foreign policy? It can be suggested that even for a superpower like America the margins for policy changes are smaller than the Republicans are now inclined to assume, in the euphoria of their election victory. But, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that on 4 November a political landslide took place in America which was greater in extent than any that has taken place since Roosevelt's victory in 1932. The new Senate is more likely to encourage a more militant foreign policy than to restrain it. The liberal forces that so often tripped up Nixon and Kissinger are nearly enough out of power. What takes place with regard to Poland may very well decide the amount of change in American foreign policy. Should the Soviet Union yet invade, then the ultraconservative forces' hold on American foreign policy would be strengthened considerably.

An intensive and openhearted European-American dialog is urgently necessary as quickly as possible after Reagan's taking power on 20 January. In a dialog of that kind, first place on the agenda must be given to the question of what ought to be the fundamental principles of NATO security policy over the next few years. For years that has been the maintaining of an adequate system of collective defense on the one hand, and, on the other, of striving for arms control arrangements with the Soviet Union. It would be of the greatest importance if agreement could be reached about the necessity of maintaining that. The alternative, after all, would be an unlimited arms race, with the consequence of increasing tensions between the East and West. In general it seems to be important to stress the necessary of a continuing East-West dialog as a means of preventing misunderstanding as to one another's goals. A dialog of that kind remains, despite all differences of opinion, a necessary instrument for crisis control.

Differences of Opinion

A fundamental discussion of the problem of the Middle East is also highly important. Washington fears that an initiative by the EC countries could interfere with American Middle East policy. It will have to be understood by Europe that an initiative of that kind--should it ever come to that!--would have no chance of success from the start if Washington were opposed to it. That, however,

need not lead to European passivity. Ought not the European countries ask the question whether there are not other threats to the Middle East than a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf? The Palestinian question's remaining unresolved has increasingly destabilizing effects on the whole region. Can the increase of American military power in the Persian Gulf form an adequate answer to the new revolutionary developments in the pivotal states in the Middle East? Ought not a decrease in the dependence on oil imports from the Middle East by means of more radical energy conservation by the Western countries, on the one hand, and accelerated development of energy sources outside the Middle East, on the other, receive more attention?

Western Europe finds itself in a difficult position. The removal of the ties with America would provide the Soviet Union with a position of hegemony on the continent of Europe. The alternative of a European defense community seems hardly capable of realization, or it would, if it were to prove to be capable of realization, lead to some form of European atomic power and also some piece of German authority, which in its turn would again signify a dangerous strain on East-West relations. Continuing the Atlantic alliance is therefore a vital interest of Western Europe.

But clearly differences of opinion are looming up between America and Western Europe. The Republicans show a strong inclination to shift the accent from arms control to increased military efforts. Now that it considers it necessary to devote more attention to Soviet expansion outside Europe, the United States wants to call upon the Western European countries for greater military efforts than they feel they are in a position to make. On the other hand, the importance of continued close cooperation with Western Europe is also felt in the United States. Possibly it will prove that some differences of opinion are unbridgeable, and Western Europe and the United States, without giving up the Atlantic alliance, will still come to be further apart from one another. But in any case an attempt must be made by Europe to enter into an intensive discussion with the United States in the early months of the Reagan administration while a choice still has to be made in Washington between diverse policy options, and to call for as much understanding as possible for European concerns and insights.

6940
CSO: 3105

POLL SHOWS MAJORITY OF NONSOCIALISTS PREFERS COALITION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 11 Jan 81 p 3

[Text] More than three-fourths of the voters who sympathize with the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party or the Center Party would like to see a three-party government formed after the Storting election in the fall according to the weekly poll from Norway's Market Data. Opposition is low, with only one-tenth of the voters backing the three parties against a coalition government. There are also more for than against cooperation among the three biggest nonsocialist parties among Liberal voters.

In all close to half the people favor a coalition by the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party aimed at presenting a government alternative. Among Labor and Socialist-Left voters opponents of a nonsocialist government are in the majority.

The Norway's Market Data survey was conducted in November and around 1500 men and women over 15 years of age were asked this question:

"Before the last Storting election the three biggest nonsocialist parties, the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, cooperated to offer a government alternative. Are you for or against continued binding cooperation among these three parties?"

The table below shows the responses in percentages for all those asked as well as dividing the responses up according to the party respondents would vote for if a Storting election were being held today.

	For	Against	Don't know	Total
All respondents	45	24	31	100
Labor	22	42	36	100
Socialist-Left	14	52	34	100
Conservative	77	12	11	100
Christian People's Party	76	8	16	100
Center	79	6	15	100
Liberal	45	26	29	100

If we leave those who answered "don't know" out of the calculation we find that 65 percent of all those who took a stand favored cooperation by the Conservatives, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party. In a similar poll taken in March 1979 somewhat fewer of those who took a stand, 57 percent, favored such cooperation.

6578
CSO: 3108

PAPER DISCUSSES PROBLEM OF COALITION WITH LIBERALS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Jan 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Political parties that have made a specialty of riding two horses, first one and then the other--and often both at the same time--will certainly attract attention and may even enjoy a brief period of success. But in the long run there isn't much there to count on. The Liberal Party, at one time synonymous with the "wavering line" in Norwegian politics, was so torn by schism that the party dissolved itself at the historic Roros meeting in 1972. Reminiscences of that party, the present Liberal Party under Hans Hammond Rossbach's leadership, continue where the old one left off and in summing up the party's conduct also in recent years it can be said quite simply that the Liberals are still the same. In spite of a steady flow of explanations in various newspapers it is impossible to know what the party really believes--or stands for.

It is true that the Liberals have scored some points by being able to give the answers distracted people may expect from a party in a confused period of time. The Alta issue, the stockpiling issue, fear of war and nuclear terror give the outlines of a political field of operations in which the Liberals have deliberately exploited latent emotionalism. But if one examines the party's standpoints more closely one is left with the impression--as so often before--of opportunism and moral weakness. It may surprise many people that the Christian People's Party and the Center Party have placed so much emphasis on a political solidarity with the same Liberal Party, a party existing somewhere in the political borderland between the Labor Party and the Socialist-Left. Logically enough the Liberals have announced that they would not take part in a nonsocialist government that included the Conservatives. Rossbach's Liberal Party has never concealed the fact that it regards the Conservative Party as its major political opponent.

But the Liberals are still Liberals and what could we expect other than party chairman Hans Hammond Rossbach's statement in a New Year's speech that the Liberals would work for a nonsocialist government after the fall election. This brings us to the question of what kind of government this would be and what policy would it pursue if it also included the Liberals. We are assuming that

no one is seriously contemplating a government in which both the Liberals and Conservatives would participate at the same time. The policies of these two parties have been demonstrated to be so fundamentally different that such a partnership would not inspire much confidence among the voters.

To illuminate this problem we quote statements made by Liberal general secretary Asbjorn Liland to FOLKETS FRAMTID on 12 November 1980:

"The Liberals are on such a collision course with the Conservatives that a government cooperation with that party is not possible.

"Our very critical attention in relation to such a (nonsocialist) three-party government would be much more intense than the current Socialist-Left criticism of the Labor Party.

"If the Liberal Party came into a pivotal position central elements of party policy would determine whether we supported any government or not."

The Liberal general secretary was then asked if this applied even if the outcome was a new Labor government. To this he replied:

"Yes. In our estimation the Labor Party after a pause for reflection would pursue a policy more in line with our wishes than a so-called 'distinct' government would."

After that it should be quite clear that the only way voters can get an active government is to vote for one of the three nonsocialist parties, the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party or the Center Party. A nonsocialist majority government depends on a majority for these three parties alone.

6578
CSO: 3108

DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT, POLAND

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Jan 81 p 5

[Text] Defense Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in a speech to the Oslo Military Society yesterday advocated linking western defense moves to negotiation offers on arms control and disarmament. However the lack of openness in the Soviet system seriously hinders such a policy, he stressed. The fact that it is impossible to weigh public opinion in many countries makes it difficult to bring international pressure to bear on both sides to push developments in the right direction. New ideas are needed, he said and mentioned the proposal for nuclear-free zones. But he warned against dangerous policies of illusion in this area.

The defense minister said work on arms control and disarmament is the biggest security challenge we face. He thought it was a positive sign that in countries where it is possible to measure public opinion there has been mounting impatience with the lack of progress in this area. At the same time he deplored the fact that in many countries due to their closed systems it is not possible to influence public opinion or to gauge its sentiments.

But this should not stop us from linking significant defense steps in the West to negotiation offers on arms control and disarmament as occurred in connection with the controversial NATO resolution in December 1979 on modernization of continental nuclear weapons. This led to negotiation contacts, he reminded his audience, and that in a period that was not marked by detente or a good climate for negotiation.

"We could be forced to use dual resolutions as a model for our efforts to halt and then deflect the arms race in an international negotiating climate that bears signs that the Soviet Union is increasing its military strength in many areas," said Stoltenberg.

"Such a plan would give negotiators the realistic framework needed to get results. It takes into account the need for mutuality and balance in arms control moves."

The defense minister stressed that work to halt further arms escalation of both conventional and nuclear strength must be done to insure peace but not by jeopardizing it--therefore the goal at all times should be to achieve an approximate balance between East and West.

"On the other hand we can't just leave it at having an approximate balance and making sure things stay like that. We have an incessant need for ideas and proposals that can help turn back the arms race. This is where the proposal for nuclear-free zones comes in," said Stoltenberg who put the proposal in the broad context in which it must be evaluated.

In the first place, the defense minister pointed out, the situation in Poland could lead us to a crossroad in security policy--an invasion would mean the loss of many detente opportunities. On the other hand if things go well in Poland it would open the way to resuming and continuing the work of security and cooperation in Europe. The Soviet Union's experiences in East European lands could result in an openness to new security arrangements in Europe. A process could get started that might include nuclear-free zones as one element.

The defense minister then underlined the superordinate goal we should keep in view during such a process--nuclear-free zones must contribute to increased security. A vital prerequisite for this is the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons. This means that in some areas there must be bans on any form of new development and the placement of certain types of weapons while in other zones arrangements must be worked out to reduce forces or establish ceilings on military forces.

"Without an actual reduction of nuclear weapons nuclear-free zones could be part of an illusion based on two dangers--the belief in documentary guarantees from the superpowers that make us dependent on the mutual trust between them and their reliability in tight situations and the belief that limited nuclear warfare is possible, in other words that we could have a nuclear war going on alongside the zone and above it but not in it."

In his remarks on the tasks performed for the civilian society by the armed forces through the Rescue Service and the Coast Guard the defense minister suggested that another organizational form be found for these services. It was apparent from what he said that the turmoil about the use of rescue helicopters in connection with the Alta affair had given relevance to this idea.

Stoltenberg reminded his audience that carrying out the vital social tasks performed by the Rescue Service and the Coast Guard had been assigned to the armed forces with the idea of utilizing our social resources in a good way. But now that we have had some experience with this we can see that the coupling of civilian and military activities presents both practical and basic theoretical problems, he maintained.

"Various civil organs with broad tasks are taskmasters for the Rescue Service and the Coast Guard. The fact that the tasks are of a purely civilian nature and are assigned by civilian authorities makes it problematic whether military groups should be carrying them out. For example I doubt that anyone had an Alta situation in mind when the Rescue Service was planned."

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POLITICAL STRATEGY OF EANES, MARIO SOARES, DEMOCRATIC LEFT

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 30 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Eduardo Prado Coelho: "The Great Winter Maneuvers"]

[Text] 1

The analysis of the political situation is so clear that all there is to say right now can be summarized in a few lines without much originality.

The election of Gen Ramalho Eanes in the first round with a percentage that leaves no room for doubt had several consequences already foreseen beforehand.

In the first place, it checked the momentum of the right that had been characteristic of Portugal's activity recently Today, we can say that, just as the militancy of the left reached its high point and went into a decline with 25 November, the militancy of the right reached its maximum with the 5 October election this year and entered a crisis with the choice of Soares Carneiro as candidate for president and, then, already on the list of the unforeseeable consequences of that choice, with the death of Sa Carneiro and Amaro da Costa, all leads to the assumption that, starting now, the political involvement of the right will tend to decrease.

This process can be seen in several aspects of the present scene. On the one hand, there is a natural withdrawal of certain individuals and ideological sectors most involved in the Soares Carneiro project: resignations in the RDP [expansion unknown; possibly Portuguese Radio Broadcasting System] and the RTP [Portuguese Radio-Television System], silence of Mota Pinto and Cunha Rego, actual dismissal of some political commentators, very appreciable change in tone in others (Sousa Tavares, for example), or even the delightful simulated hara-kiri of Jose Miguel Judice (who is calmly continuing his career, notable moreover, as a political analyst, hinting merely that formerly -- wonder of wonders! -- his writings were impartial and that, starting now, and in view of the gravity of the situation, they are going to cease being impartial). On the other hand, note should be taken of the great increase in interest by a large number of economic, social and cultural sectors in the finally likable, finally affable personality of Gen Ramalho Eanes, who has merited ceaseless attention from some of the news media, previously somewhat neglectful. The most flagrant example of this change in tone is, perhaps, the Madeira leader Alberto Joao Jardim, not to mention certain high-ranking military men. All this forms a change in political atmosphere and a redistribution of roles that is today an undeniable new event in the history of the political movement that started on 25 April [1974]. That -- and

only that -- was what was attempted with support of President Eanes as a candidate for reelection. That is what was achieved.

2

Some more reticent or shortsighted persons argued that the fact of that candidacy was not a candidacy of the left. We have to realize, with some distress, that many of those who have responsibilities in large and small parties do not always show that they have the slightest vocation for the most rudimentary principles of political analysis. Because the state of affairs was very clear in the data that it furnished: the candidacy that best served the interests of the Portuguese left could only be a candidacy that was not of the left. If the left had made the lighthearted mistake of entering its own candidate, the left would only be working toward the interests of the right.

Today it is easy to observe that, since 7 December, the situation has been more than ever favorable to the formulation of a strategy of the democratic left. There are various reasons:

a. In the first place, because the victory of General Eanes was objectively a defeat of the Communist Party, inasmuch as it implies a checking of bipolarization and a recentering of Portugal's political activity.

(The question is asked how, then, is the support given to Eanes by the PC [Communist Party]. The reason is simple. If Soares Carneiro had won and if he had stayed in the framework of democratic legality, the natural reaction of the left would be a regrouping in an antifascist direction, reviving all the old mythologies and rhetorics within which the Communist Party would have undisputed leadership. The candidacy of Soares Carneiro simply was presented with so much rightist vigor that it had all the essentials for starting a process that would definitely move away from democratic legality and would have unforeseeable consequences. In that connection, it can be said that the Communist Party chose, with great clearsightedness and reflection, between a certain lesser evil (Eanes's victory) and a probable greater evil (Soares Carneiro's victory).)

b. In the second place, because the center-right, supported in part by the Balsemao government, is going to have to govern under especially difficult conditions. The economic and social situation is unfavorable. Comparison with the Sa Carneiro government is inevitable and mythicizing of the past will tend to emerge spontaneously and by manipulation.

c. In the third place, because the left finally has time to reflect on its own strategy and ideological orientation. This makes it possible to recover from the reverses undergone, in a climate of calm (let us hope).

3

Nuno Rocha, editor of O TEMPO, who, when he wants to, knows how to utilize Marxism like no one else, told, in the last issue of his newspaper, a small story that gives us, in its brief outline, an entire implacable analysis in terms of class struggles. This is the episode:

"Almoco--The editor of O TEMPO was lunching yesterday in the Gambrinus Restaurant with Prof Freitas do Amaral, when a note arrived at the table. The acting prime minister opened it, read it and wrote a few words in reply. Afterwards, he confided to me that 'It is from a lady who is having lunch over there and who says "Do not abandon us."'" (O TEMPO, 24 December 1980).

What is Nuno Rocha trying to imply with this brief anecdote? Two things, at least:

a. That the social class represented by Gambrinus patrons (the more underprivileged reader, as the theoreticians say, can become aware of this sociological reality by looking at the prices on the door) feels abandoned at this time.

b. That the political line of Prof Freitas do Amaral is in accordance with the expression of the class interests of the social group made up of the Gambrinus patrons.

This is the ticklish basis of the Balsemao government. Regardless of what may be said, regardless of what may be done, this is the situation: although the institutional situation is again definitely AD [Democratic Alliance], the psychological situation is becoming increasingly less AD. Institutional and psychological cross each other in opposite directions.

A very keen perception of this process must have been what made the intervention of Lucas Pires become troublesome, because, in his various texts, Lucas Pires stated the urgent need for working out a new psychological situation against those who are trying to compensate for the increasing erosion of convictions by means of the weight of the institutions.

The personality of Francisco Balsemao deserves our greatest appreciation. His honesty and his qualities are unquestionable. The government that he has formed is a considerably skillful balance between a specific project and the pressure of party realities. Simply, this government can only succeed, if it can become perceptive by its practice, which does not attempt to have the fatal ambiguity persist that places it between the defeated political strategy of Sa Carneiro and the urgency for formulating a new strategy. In this case, as in others, "enduring ambiguity" may be brilliant in the short term, but it will be disastrous in the medium term (the same formulation will be applicable, in another context, to Mario Soares).

4

From the point of view of the left, it is necessary to realize that the psychological decline of the political situation of the AD (all the more noticeable in reality the more it has been denied verbally and institutionally) does not agree with an increasing automatic, minimizing, euphoric affirmation by the FRS [Republican and Socialist Front.] The sweet illusion that it would suffice to wait. It is necessary to realize what is being shifted completely in the machinery of the Portuguese political scene, in order to understand, finally, this relatively simple thing: the declining trend of the AD is, at the same time, the declining trend of the FRS, unless the FRS has the political courage and imagination to formulate a new strategy right now.

This is where the morbid, narcissistic involvement in the "Mario Soares issue" has troublesome consequences for the democratic left.

5

What does the right of Mario Soares expect?

The answer is linear. It wants him, moved by his well-known antiEanism and encouraged by an awareness of the dangers of a "Peronism" that he himself has imagined, to try to reduce the presidential powers as much as possible in the terms of a constitutional revision, so that the right may recover the effects of the 5 October election to the detriment of the effects of the 7 December election. It is a right that feels defeated and that is attempting to nullify, by means of Mario Soares, the effects of that defeat.

Mario Soares, in his prudent, contradictory action (the various interviews granted do not strike convincingly), has tried not to burn any of the bridges for a future intervention. Therefore, without ever confirming the scenario that the right is suggesting to him, he continues to increase signs that he is not entirely detached from it. The emphasis on the dangers of an "Eanes Party" (for which Mario Soares has been, up to now, the only enthusiastic propagandist) points in that direction.

6

An Eanes Party?

The idea is absurd. All the more so when it is said, at the same time, that Eanes is questioning the existence of parties and that Eanes is said to be trying to promote the creation of his own party.

But that confusion is symptomatic. It marks the uneasiness caused by the fact that it must be recognized that the political strength of Eanes on the Portuguese scene results precisely from the fact that he is outside political parties.

Because of the full awareness of that, no one around Eanes shows the slightest interest in the hypothesis : the establishment of a "presidential" party.

The hypothesis of an Eanes Party is a point put out only for two kinds of reasons:

a. The reasons of those who are attempting to wave about that illusion for the purpose of creating an "anti-Eanes" consensus capable to taking content away from the 7 December victory, reasons obviously of the right.

b. The reasons of those who, within the PS [Socialist Party], would like certain sectors of the party to "break away," in order to facilitate their power maneuvers, reasons of party struggle.

Therefore, we should be clear. No one is trying to create an "Eanes Party," because the "Eanes movement," as it shaped up in presidential activity, is a period of understanding and defense of the essential values of democracy, but it is not the programatic base sufficient for any partisan type movement. And, for that very reason, among those who, having supported Eanes, are in the area of democratic socialism, no one appears to be inclined to abandon the Socialist Party to make life easier for those who are trying to run it as a mere private club.

We all agree that political parties are essential to democratic activity and are in the service of democracy.

But the risk that democracy will pass over to being in the service of political parties must be prevented.

This distinction is not always clear in the heads of certain party leaders.

The strength of "Eanism" increases whenever it is anticipated that, in the opinion of certain parties, democracy exists only to serve them.

Therefore, defense of democracy does not depend on an obstinate defense of political parties as they exist, but rather on the need for an effective democratization of those parties, both in their internal functioning and in the way in which they contribute to the effective democratization of the society in which they are incorporated.

Continuing to defend parties without thorough reflection on their method of operating and of their incorporation in the civil society to which they belong can in no way be either a position of the left or a socialist attitude.

The panic caused by "Eanism" is the panic of those who feel that they are disarmed with regard to all the positions and figures that come, because of their behavior, to reveal objectively the formalistic and nondemocratic aspects of party functioning.

"Eanism" must not be read as a threat to the parties, but rather as a symptom warning them of the urgency for their effective democratization. As Jacques Julliard writes, "it is illusory today to expect progress from participative democracy and even less so from self-management, without a serious correction of the role of parties and of their manners of participating in political activity."[1] Because, as can be read in an already classic work by Robert Michels, "any party organization represents an oligarchic trend supported on a democratic base." Now, the organizational structure trend is to develop the oligarchic component to the detriment of the democratic component. As Michels says, "what is there oppresses what should be." Therefore, "in a party, the interests of the organized masses of which it consists are far from coinciding with the interests of the bureaucracy personifying it."[2] It becomes necessary, therefore, to develop the space in a political society in which political parties, social movements (organized around a specific objective) and the citizens in general are incorporated in a process of mutual democratization. The fear of "independents" (with regard to which it is always hinted that they are probably dependent on something less clear), the discrediting of social movements (almost always supported in the name of power conflicts) are very serious signs of the conservativism being introduced within the forces of the left. The ones most terrified of "Eanism," the ones most frightened by the terrible statements made by Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo (whom a certain PS sector has now begun to attack) or by

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[1] Jacques Julliard, "Against Professional Politics," Paris, Seuil, 1977, p 132.

[2] Robert Michels, "Political Parties," Paris, Flammarion, 1971 (1914), pp 296 and 289.

Nobre da Costa (accused of the crime of observing that the boundaries of Portugal's political parties are extremely vague and ambiguous at present), are always the ones who, installed in the bureaucracy of the political parties to which they belong, firmly attached to a political profession that they understand only as a profession and not as a civic function, see in those statements and attitudes a real threat to the bureaucracy that defends their interests.

Thus, it becomes amusing to observe how some are attempting to give new vigor to the party system by appealing, for example, to the sense of identity and to the nature of the Socialist Party (see the words by Tito de Morais to PORTUGAL HOJE, 26 December 1980) and others, like Manuel Alegre, located in a nearby area, come to tell us (see the important article by Manuel Alegre in ACCAO SOCIALISTA) that the Socialist Party has no ideology, no program, no strategy and that the greatest variety of ideological options are combined in it, in the most total confusion. If this is so, where can the nature and identity of the party be found? In precarious realities of a mythological nature, or in the constantly emotional evocation of antifascist resistance, or of anti-Goncalvo resistance, or in the charismatic figure of Mario Soares, or in the development of a more or less narrow club spirit (as Mario Soares himself says: "a party with an extraordinarily generous rank-and-file, perhaps too much closed in itself, with a great club feeling (let us say) of its own identity and autonomy" (EXPRESSO, 13 December 1980 [FBIS DAILY REPORT -- WEST EUROPE, 13 January 1981]).

Therefore, the Socialist Party has to do the following in the very near future:

a. Take the necessary steps for its effective internal democratization.[1]

b. Find effective ways for becoming incorporated, in democratic dynamics, with what is outside it (that is to say, with the various forms of political activity nonpartisan in aspect).

c. Have the capability for the political initiative and imagination needed in a period of crisis of certain institutional forms and of hesitant emergence of others.

Because of all this, it is becoming necessary to dedramatize the "Mario Soares issue," denouncing what there is in it of abusive exploitation by a party bureaucracy that feels threatened in its interests, and demonstrating that real ideological options depend on more deepseated and more complex cleavages. The "Mario Soares issue" is secondary, but some persons are trying to make it essential, so that what is essential will not become an issue.

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[1] The present overall picture is not encouraging. Reading ACCAO SOCIALISTA is as amusing as seeing a cowboy movies in an old district theater. In order to make the atmosphere more pleasant, the "Farpas" [banderillas] section has been resurrected. Alfredo Barroso, a competent, cultured and mature journalist should measure the consequences of opening the columns of his newspaper to this indigent author of "Farpas," obviously lacking an ideological point of view, weak in argumentative ability, shortsighted in the most elementary reading exercises and, on top of that, devoid of the slightest sense of humor. The disastrous exploits of this apprentice of Zorro contribute in no way to the enlightenment of Socialist Party members and to the establishment of a climate of effective democratic confrontation.

CDS RELATIONSHIP, STRATEGY, SUPPORT TO NEW GOVERNMENT

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 23 Dec 80 pp 3-5

[Interview with CDS President Diogo Freitas do Amaral, by Torquato da Luz and Carlos Plantier in Lisbon on 19 December 1980]

[Text] Diogo Freitas do Amaral, aged 39 and a law professor, is president of CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and acting prime minister since the tragic death of Sa Carneiro. He is a calm man, whose physical appearance, combined with great reflection and a distinct impression of weighing his comments, make him seem less young.

He received us (the director and editor-in-chief of A TARDE) last Friday, in the prime minister's official residence, for an interview which lasted nearly an hour, and which was taped in its entirety. We are reprinting it without any changes (including only a few subheadings for which we are responsible).

[Question] We would like to begin with a question relating to the position that CDS has assumed recently, in the direction of total support for the government which is being formed. How would you, Professor, reconcile that total support for the Balsemao government with your personal refusal to participate therein?

[Answer] My refusal to participate in the next government has nothing to do with the CDS strategy or with any party tactic related to the future government. It is a personal decision based essentially on a reason associated with consistency. I think that I should maintain the position that I assumed before the presidential elections whereby, if General Eanes won the elections, I would not remain in the government. I think that I should maintain it, and I reaffirm the fact that there are no ingredients of a strategic or tactical nature, therefore, in that decision. With that decision made, the matter of the CDS' total support exists independent of it. My party is of the opinion that it should give total support to the Democratic Alliance government, for a number of reasons. To facilitate that decision for total support, I shall also support the next executive branch; however, I shall not be among its members. The fact that I remain outside of the government does not have any less noble purpose of intention; rather, there is the determination to support it, to assist it and to cooperate with it, doing everything to see that it achieves complete success. It seems to me that this is the nation's interest, and the interest of the Democratic Alliance as well.

[Question] Therefore, your main reason is a reason based on consistency. However, the political situation since recent events, specifically since Dr Sa Carneiro's death, has changed and could, to some extent, cause a shift in attitude on your part with respect to your participation in the government....

[Answer] The political situation has, in fact, changed in some respects (not all), something that could eventually prompt me to change my position. I must say that I reflected deeply on this, and that I was not, nor am I now insensitive to all the expressions of sympathy and support that I received, both from CDS, and from PSD [Social Democratic Party] and PPM [Popular Monarchist Party], in connection with a reconsideration of my position and participation in the government. In any case, I reached the conclusion that, although there may have been many changes in the political situation, they did not warrant a change in the decision that I had made. On the contrary, I think that if I have any useful role to play at present within the Democratic Alliance that role would entail, and even demand, that the people, namely, the AD electorate, have confidence in my ability to act in such a way as to contribute to the consistency and effectiveness of the Democratic Alliance's plan. Now that credibility would be seriously damaged if I went back on my word and ended up remaining in the government. If it were a matter of changing a position to decide to leave the government as a result of that change, everything would be easier; but to change one's mind to continue in the government would smack of unbounded ambition which, thank God, I do not have.

AD Won Six Victories on Seven Essential Points

[Question] But you must be aware that, in certain circles, namely the opposition, it has been announced that, since Dr Sa Carneiro's death, like it or not, you are the personage who has emerged in the eyes of the public as a "leader" of the Democratic Alliance, and that this leadership position would not be in keeping with participation in the government in a subordinate capacity, in anything other than a leadership post. You must certainly be cognizant of those views....

[Answer] I know about them. However, in the 6 and a half years in which I have been actively engaged in politics, I have learned that we cannot tailor our behavior by what the commentators say, much less by what the opposition commentators publish. The fact is that, upon taking a position, I do so for definite reasons which are serious and clear, and which I do not hesitate to announce. Later, there are always people who consider themselves very intelligent and who give other motives, which are supposed to be the real, although hidden, motives for the decision that was made. I can only disdain that type of interpretation. The real reasons are the ones that I give, and have decided upon; and the people who believe in me know that, when I tell them this, I am not untruthful.

[Question] However, still on the subject of the CDS' participation in the future government, we think that there has been speculation on its formation in some respects: For example, mention has been made of the existence of, shall we say, two factions, two blocs within your party, of the same substance, based on the possibility of the appointment of Dr Lucas Pires or Dr Basilio Horta to an important post in the new executive branch. In your capacity as president of CDS, we would like you to comment on this situation.

[Answer] I shall be very glad to give you some explanation, although I must say at the outset that I shall not play the game of making statements about who is or who is not going to join the government, or who is or who is not going to hold one position or another. What we have debated within CDS, in the National Council, has been serious problems, important problems. And, with respect to them, we have held a democratic, candid and fair debate, without any kind of confrontation; which is evident from the fact that the decisions of the last National Council meeting were unanimously approved, some of them even by acclamation. The point that you mention has been debated, although no one has shown up to clearly defend one view or another. It was, unquestionably, more important to discuss the matter of finding out whether, after these presidential elections, there were winners and losers among the CDS leaders, or not. This is because, in the press, and that of the opposition in particular, that view prevailed.

In that regard, I made a statement in the political analysis of the National Council (which was unanimously approved), concluding that there were neither winners nor losers and that the leaders of the Democratic Alliance (including Dr Sa Carneiro and engineer Amaro da Costa) could not be considered defeated in the presidential election. What seems to me in keeping with the reality is that the one who was defeated in the presidential election was, in the first place, the candidate backed by the Democratic Alliance (Gen Soares Carneiro), to whom I wish, once again, to pay tribute for the worthy and lofty manner in which he conducted his campaign and accepted the verdict of the polls, and, on the other hand, the presidential component of the Democratic Alliance's overall strategy. To explain more clearly: AD has an overall strategy which covers various areas (the area of the parliamentary majority, the area of the government, the area of the national plan for transformation of the society, the area of the local governments, the area of cooperation in several other realms, specifically among the youth, and the area of the presidency of the republic). It was only the latter (the sixth in the series) that was defeated, as we all know. But this in no way invalidates the other points in the Democratic Alliance's plan, nor does it mean that AD as a whole, or its leaders, can now be cited as having been totally defeated, just because of the presidential elections.

The fact is that, in the elections of 5 October, wherein a parliamentary majority was formed from which the right to govern during the 4 years emerged, a victory was won, a victory which is lasting and which represents the essential foundation for the construction of the future. Whereas the temporary majority which appeared in the presidential elections is depleted at election time, the results of the legislative election will make it possible to construct a solution from a parliamentary majority and a government for 4 years. And if the Democratic Alliance wins five victories out of six (the essential points in that strategy numbering six), it can never be concluded that there has been an overall defeat.

Hence, this is a point which was debated and clarified among our members. As for the composition of the government itself, that is, the matter of ascertaining who among the party leaders and among its most capable experts should join the next executive branch, that was a question which, in accordance with the tradition within CDS (because this is the third time that this has occurred), the party decided to give me full authority for personal guidance on this point in talks with the future prime minister, Dr Francisco Balsemao.

This vote of confidence, and of full powers for negotiating the formation of the government on behalf of the party, was approved unanimously and by acclamation. Hence, this is a question that has been decided on by me, and has nothing to do either with discussions among party organs, factions or any pressure which may possibly exist or be brought to bear. I must say that I do not feel obliged, nor am I willing to decide on this matter on the basis of press campaigns which might be started, nor under any other type of pressure.

Doubts and Reservations

[Question] To go back a little, let us reflect on the defeat of the AD choice in the presidential election. What do you think, Professor, should have been done to prevent that defeat and the resultant failure of Soares Carneiro's plan. More specifically, what would the alternative have been?

[Answer] It is obvious that the matter of analyzing the causes for the defeat of Gen Soares Carneiro and of the Democratic Alliance's presidential strategy, together with the matter (which is the other side of the coin) of analyzing the causes of Gen Ramalho Eanes' victory, is yet to be resolved. In our party, we have been examining that matter from all angles, and I can say that, for my part, I have reached some conclusions. With regard to Gen Ramalho Eanes, I suppose that he benefited, first of all, from the fact that he was president of the republic; something that is always an advantageous situation, as attested to by similar examples in other democratic countries where the incumbent president is seldom defeated in a campaign for his reelection. Secondly, he benefited from the fact that he was known all over the country, from the fact that he had been president for 4 and a half years. Thirdly, he also benefited from the fact that his ideas were not well known, his personal plans were ambiguous, and his mistakes and most negative attitudes throughout the first term were not sufficiently learned by the majority of the population.

This is due partly to us, during 1980, especially those of us who were in the government. We always refused, because of a notion of the state's dignity, to make any attack on the president of the republic. Hence, we could not start making a complete, overt explanation of these features (namely, the most negative facets of Gen Ramalho Eanes' term) until we had begun the presidential campaign, which was obviously too little time to achieve a complete explanation.

As for the reasons that may have led to the defeat of Gen Soares Carneiro, I would stress three, essentially: in the first place, the fact that he was a rather unknown person. When we decided to back Gen Soares Carneiro's candidacy, we did so mainly on the basis of the criterion that consisted of ascertaining who would be, who could be the best president, once elected. We may perhaps have disregarded another criterion (which is also important, as we can observe), namely, that of determining who would be the best candidate for conducting a campaign that could lead him to the presidency.

The fact is that Gen Soares Carneiro was a relatively unknown person, and neither the election campaign nor the precampaign was sufficient to win him the elections.

Secondly, I think that the campaign, in my opinion an illegitimate and abusive one carried out by the Communist Party concerning Gen Soares Carneiro's past, may also

have had a negative effect. To be sure, the main accusations made against him did not have any grounds, but the fact is that this campaign was conducted on such a scale and with such a great lack of scruples that it may have had its effect on public opinion.

The third reason is associated with the fact that the Democratic Alliance did not demonstrate such great unity in support of Gen Soares Carneiro as it did in the backing for the party leaders during the legislative elections. Although there was not a significant amount of direct opposition, it is true that the doubts or reservations expressed by leaders of the Democratic Alliance parties concerning the choice of Gen Soares Carneiro had negative repercussions on the chances for victory of the candidate backed by AD.

[Question] For what exact reasons could those situations, a matter of timing although important, as has been proven, have occurred?

[Answer] I don't think that there is a single explanation, but that the causes are different, depending on the individuals. I don't believe that there was an organized movement, or an agreed upon strategy. There was a certain number of persons, from different parties, who for various reasons either did not agree with the selection of the candidate whom AD backed or did agree, and even proposed that nomination, and later reneged. Others may have felt, at the halfway mark, that victory was not certain, and did not want to commit themselves up until the end to a cause that seemed lost to them. In short, the reasons are quite varied, but the fact is that there were situations of this kind which, as a whole, had a certain effect.

Sa Carneiro's Death

[Question] But among the causes that we have mentioned leading to the defeat of Gen Soares Carneiro and the resultant victory of General Eanes, don't you think, Professor, that the death of Dr Sa Carneiro at the time when it occurred had a decisive effect on the election results?

[Answer] That is a difficult matter, on which I hesitate to make a statement, because I don't think that I have at hand all the evidence necessary for a response with grounds. In any event, I would like to tell you this: I have in my possession the results of the last poll that the Democratic Alliance had taken a week before the presidential election; that is, on the previous Sunday. Now that poll indicated a victory for Gen Ramalho Eanes with a 16-point difference; which is precisely what happened the next Sunday between the candidate who won and his nearest rival. Hence, the fact is that the 16-point difference already existed a week before, and it continued, without being influenced at all by the tragic death of Dr Sa Carneiro. In any case, there is also another possible interpretation: That poll indicated a relative position with a 16-point difference, but on a considerably lower level that is, on a level of under 50 percent, causing a runoff election to be predicted. The fact that the results superseded 50 percent, although retaining the 16-point difference, leads to the conviction that the 20 percent undecided that existed a week earlier may have decided in the same proportions during the final days; in other words, there was a distribution in the same proportion that existed among those who had already decided to vote for the two leading candidates. Therefore, there was no massive concentration of votes among the undecided either for General Eanes or for Gen Soares Carneiro. It is here that one might ask whether, if Dr Sa Carneiro's death had not occurred, the distribution of votes among the undecided would have been different, and whether there might have been a greater concentration for the candidate backed by the Democratic Alliance.

[Question] One final question about this matter of the presidential elections. Professor, do you think that the reelection of Gen Ramalho Eanes represents a threat to the continuation of AD?

[Answer] I would like to state clearly that I uphold all the declarations and predictions that I made before the presidential election. I made them sometimes alone, and on other occasions in conjunction with Dr Sa Carneiro, and on still others with Gen Soares Carneiro. I made those statements with the conviction that they were correct, and I uphold them in their entirety; that is, I still think that there is, in the reelection of Gen Ramalho Eanes, a series of enormous risks to democracy (as I interpret it), and also to the Democratic Alliance.

However, Gen Ramalho Eanes won, and made a group of promises to the effect that he would totally respect the Democratic Alliance majority and its right to govern, and to govern well, with effectiveness and authority, during the next 4 years. The problem that is posed now is that of learning whether or not those firm promises will be kept. Personally, I do not think that we in the Democratic Alliance can or should merely accept these statements on their face value and ease our minds.

I think that we must maintain an attitude of constant vigilance, we must be alert and wide awake, because there are dangers, either from a possible action by the president of the republic, or from a likely action from some of the forces which backed him. Those are two areas that sometimes seem to be confused, and I think that they should be kept separate.

It is one thing to learn whether Gen Ramalho Eanes is going to continue his plans, and his action opposed to the satisfactory functioning of the Democratic Alliance, or not; and it is another thing to find out whether or not the forces which backed him will try to take advantage of the victory to destroy the Democratic Alliance. Insofar as this second aspect is concerned, I do not have any doubts. The attitude of the opposition points in that direction, and the strategy and objectives of the Communist Party, specifically, are clearcut, and will not undergo any reduction. The PC [Communist Party] has already been very clear in its statements, claiming that Gen Ramalho Eanes' reelection represents a great political victory for the Communist Party, and putting forward planks and demands, especially that claiming that it is necessary to make the parliamentary majority correspond to the presidential majority, that is, the majority that occurred in the last elections. By this it is seeking to claim that the Assembly of the Republic must be dissolved so as to call early elections, in an attempt to reproduce in new legislative elections, to be held as soon as possible, the results that occurred in the presidential elections.

This seems to me to be a clearcut strategy, which I consider quite undemocratic, since it challenges, 2 months later, elections that have been held and are valid for 4 years. To the Communist Party, an election held for 4 years would only be valid for 2 months, and could then be challenged. Now in my view this is completely undemocratic; and therefore we must be quite well prepared, secure, united and determined to successfully oppose that strategy.

With regard to the matter of the individual action of the president of the republic, I repeat that we must be vigilant; if he keeps his promises, all the better.... But in order to do so, he will have to change his behavior during 1980.

I would not allow anyone to say now that the blame for the institutional conflicts that have occurred this year lies with Dr Sa Carneiro. The fact is that the government, at the express instruction of its prime minister, never took the initiative in any conflict with the president of the republic. What happened was, on the contrary, that Gen Ramalho Eanes, from the first day of the government's existence and since the speech delivered when the government took office, assumed a position of obvious hostility, and at times even one of obstruction toward the action of the executive branch. Therefore, if the president of the republic now wants to keep his most recent promises for a satisfactory understanding with the Democratic Alliance, it is he who will have to change his behavior, not we.

'I Find It Hard To Believe That All Will Go Well'

[Question] But do you think that Gen Ramalho Eanes will maintain a policy of obstruction toward a government with Dr Francisco Balsemao as its head?

[Answer] I do not wish, at the present time, to make a prediction about what the policy of Gen Ramalho Eanes will be, mainly because, during his previous term, he showed that his behavior was unpredictable. What I want to do is to make the two hypotheses with which we must work very clear. One is the hypothesis that Gen Ramalho Eanes will keep his promises, respect the existence of the Democratic Alliance majority and collaborate with the respective government; the other is the hypothesis that this will not happen, either right at the start of the new executive branch's functioning, or after it has been functioning for several months.

We know that General Eanes has commitments and associations, he thinks as he thinks, he is pursuing certain goals, he has a political concept and an economic concept that are not identical to ours; and therefore it is doubtful that all this will happen even in the best of all possible worlds. In any event, I think that we must be prepared for both hypotheses: we must not help to create conflicts (as we never did in the past); but we must also not renege on our plans, our ideas and our constitutional rights as a majority and a government. We must maintain toward the president of the republic a position of independence and firmness in the defense of the Democratic Alliance's plan.

[Question] In commenting on the opposition among the parliamentary parties, Professor, you mentioned only the PC; you made no reference to the Socialist Party [PS]. In a recent interview with Dr Mario Soares given to the German newspaper DIE WELT, the possibility of a consensus between AD and PS was admitted, specifically with regard to the constitutional revision. That interpretation of Dr Mario Soares' interview could, in a way, relate to Gen Ramalho Eane's theory of the central bloc. Don't you think that, if such an AD-PS consensus were achieved, the future would bring about the situation wherein CDS would be forced into a rightwing position?

[Answer] I think not. It seems to me that the possibility of a parliamentary understanding on making the constitutional revision is in no way related to the theory of the central bloc, which is a theory pointing to a PS-PSD coalition government, and not to a PS-PSD-CDS agreement on constitutional revision. They are two different things, on completely different planes; and we have always said (we in AD), and it is recorded in the very agreement on the founding of the Democratic Alliance in the summer of 1979, the text of which I reread just yesterday, that the Democratic Alliance and the parties comprising it will refuse any government agreement with the Socialist Party, but are willing, at the outset, to make regime agreements with the

PS, specifically in areas such as the constitutional revision, European integration, national defense and other matters of the same type. Therefore, they are completely different things.

In order to make the constitutional revision, we must naturally reach agreement with the forces of the democratic opposition, namely, with the Socialist Party. It is the only way of obtaining the necessary two thirds majority.

What will the Socialist Party's strategy in this regard be? That is the other side of the coin. It is difficult to ascertain the PS' final position after its congress. But I would like to think that, whatever its conclusions may be, it will also be in the interest of the Socialist Party itself to make a clear distinction in the matter of the government agreements and the regime agreements. As for the constitutional revision, I am convinced that the Socialist Party will accept making an agreement with the Democratic Alliance, and hence make the constitutional revision viable. That is its interest as a party, and even as an opposition party; that is its interest as an alternative party for an occasion when the Democratic Alliance loses the elections; that is its interest as a democratic party, concerned with the complete democratization of the regime, specifically, through the subordination of the Armed Forces to the civilian authority.

On the other hand, I think that the Socialist Party would never accept making an agreement with the PSD to establish the central bloc so greatly desired by the president of the republic, without first having a dissolution and interim elections. And there is one reason for this: It is that, if the PS ever wanted to try to form a central bloc based on a PS-PSD agreement, it would only be interested in this after having attempted, through elections, to become the larger of the two parties, and to have the political leadership of the government and the majority, in that eventuality. Therefore, this means that if the Socialist Party were to become interested in that strategy, it would try to procure from Gen Ramalho Eanes the dissolution of the present Assembly of the Republic and a convocation of interim elections. Then, and only then, if the Democratic Alliance lost and became disbanded, and if the PSD were willing (which, moreover, I do not believe) to make that agreement, only then would the Socialist Party consider such a hypothesis. Hence, I consider it very far-fetched, and completely absent from our horizon. At the last summit meeting of the Democratic Alliance, last week, there was a very clearcut reaffirmation of the cohesion, unity and determination to continue the coalition and to reinforce its plan.

Hope in the Future of AD

[Question] Professor, do you view the future of the Democratic Alliance with great optimism?

[Answer] I would say that I view it with great determination and hope. Optimism seems to me to be an exaggerated term, not so much because of the Democratic Alliance's internal difficulties, but because of the enormous difficulties that the nation's economic situation and the international political and economic situation will create for the action of the next government. But I have hope; and I think that we shall be capable, because we have already proven it in 1980, of surmounting those and other difficulties that are in store for us. Our determination is very great to do everything to serve the country, in keeping with the confidence placed by it in us in two consecutive legislative elections.

[Question] Does it appear to you, Professor, in the current political situation, when you have left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Gen Ramalho Eanes has been reelected, there might be a change of some kind in Portuguese foreign policy; that is, might it differ substantially from the policy that has been pursued in recent months?

[Answer] That does not seem likely to me. It does not, first of all because the foreign policy that was carried out was not my foreign policy; it was the foreign policy of the Democratic Alliance, which was already part of the AD's electoral program submitted in the summer of 1979, and which was approved by a parliamentary majority in early 1980, with the solidary backing of all the political groups belonging to AD, and has now been unanimously reaffirmed at the AD summit, in the exact terms in which I implemented it this year.

On the other hand, I would also add that the foreign policy pursued during 1980, specifically in the areas wherein we stressed the pro-European and pro-Western facet, clearly and without ambiguity, in contrast to the corrupt Third World and neutral orientation of the previous governments (specifically, the governments of presidential initiative), that foreign policy has now been confirmed and ratified by the very evolution of the international situation. In early January, when the Democratic Alliance government assumed the position that it assumed with respect to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were individuals who doubted the wisdom of such a firm, clearcut position, and of the analysis that we made, claiming that there were a qualitative change of extreme seriousness in the international situation.

Today, we assume that there is no one, except the Communist Party and those alined with Moscow, with any doubt about the profound change that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has made on the worldwide political scene, or of the serious consequences that are still being experienced at present as a result of this fact; and also that no one would doubt that we are correct in stating that this represented the turning of a page by the Soviet Union, and the adoption of a strategy marked by greater aggressiveness and imperialist expansionism.

Now, everything is quite obvious, and the serious threats hovering over the independence of Poland are further proof, if any more were necessary, that our analysis was correct, that the fundamental orientation of our foreign policy has been correct and that, therefore, there is every reason to continue it.

[Question] Don't you anticipate, therefore, an attempt or a possibility of a parallel diplomacy on the part of President Ramalho Eanes?

[Answer] I don't know whether or not that will be attempted. What I do know is that we have refused it and, if it were attempted, we would not accept it. Parallel diplomacies are an aberration in a constitutional, democratic system, and caused serious obstacles to the national interest at the time when they were enacted; and we put an end to them. During the entire year of 1980, there was not any act of parallel diplomacy. Our constitutional rights were upheld, and now it is peacefully agreed by everyone that the administration of foreign policy belongs to the government, not the president of the republic or the Council of the Revolution. It is in that direction that we should continue, and I would even favor, in the constitutional revision, that there be even greater clarification than there is now in the

Constitution, of the fact that the administration of foreign policy belongs to the executive branch, and not to other organs of sovereignty.

Proenca de Carvalho: a Courageous Man

[Question] Now a question relating to the request for the dismissal of Dr Proenca de Carvalho from the presidency of Portuguese Radio-Television System [RTP]. We ask it in view of the importance of television in the area of the news media. How do you view that dismissal?

[Answer] I view it with alarm. I think that Dr Proenca de Carvalho is a courageous, intelligent man, capable of assuming responsibilities, who adopted a correct orientation as head of the Portuguese Radio-Television System. During previous periods, RTP has been dominated by parties of the Marxist left; it has been manipulated to serve purposes of a partisan nature; it has been run in an almost revolutionary and self-managed atmosphere; and, as a result of all this, it has offered the public a vast deterioration in quality and a great lack of standards in its programs, in addition to a constant political manipulation, which has respected neither the pluralism germane to a democracy nor even the most deepseated sentiments of the majority of the Portuguese people. Hence, it is necessary to introduce Portuguese television into an atmosphere of normality, democracy and respect for the laws in effect, for our people's convictions and for their most deepseated interests.

The performance of Dr Proenca de Carvalho, with the government's backing, has been guided by those objectives, and hence deserves our praise. Dr Proenca de Carvalho is now using, on the basis of Gen Ramalho Eanes' election, an argument based essentially on the anticipation of a series of negative effects that will stem from the election and that, in his opinion, will make it impossible to continue the Portuguese Radio-Television System's plan for complete democratization, in which it is engaged with the government's backing. My position is this: I am not unaware of, nor do I underestimate all the risks and dangers that Dr Proenca de Carvalho has analyzed and exposed in his letter. And I can say that I agree that the majority, if not all of those dangers and risks actually exist. But it is our very strong determination to combat them, and to do everything to preclude them, so as to prevent them from materializing.

It was for the purpose of preventing those predictions from being confirmed that the Council of Ministers assigned me to request that Dr Proenca de Carvalho reconsider his position and remain at the head of Portuguese Radio-Television. I have now carried out that mission, and Dr Proenca de Carvalho will give a response, which we are awaiting.

[Question] Professor, do you think that this "full democratization" about to be attained in RTP will also apply to the radio broadcasting system and the nationalized newspapers?

[Answer] I did not say that we have achieved the complete democratization of RTP; I said that that was our objective. We must continue with great determination and persistence; but we know that it is a long way off, and can only be achieved after some time. We shall not consider ourselves satisfied until Portuguese Radio-Television is in the position that the BBC is in in England, from the standpoint of respect for democratic pluralism and the level of quality in programs. It is in

that direction that we shall attempt to work. You ask my opinion about the status of the radio broadcasting system and the nationalized press. I must tell you that I know little about the status of radio. I admit that there may be some situations to be corrected in it, but I confess that I am not well informed on the subject.

As for the nationalized press, I must tell you that, generally speaking, it does not seem to me that there are any serious problems from the standpoint of respect for pluralism and for freedom of opinion. The serious problem which exists, and which has a heavy financial burden, is that of ascertaining whether or not there should be a nationalized press. My opinion, which is recorded in the AD's electoral program approved in 1979, is that there should be a gradual progress toward making the press privately owned again; this is because, in a Western-type pluralist democracy, it does not make sense to have a state-controlled press.

[Question] To conclude, one quick question which will certainly also merit a quick answer. Outside of the government, does Prof Freitas do Amaral consider himself in any way to be in "reserve" status?

[Answer] No, I don't consider myself to be in reserve status; I consider myself to be active. And it is as an active member that I shall work (in CDS, in the Democratic Alliance and in Parliament) toward making the execution of the plan viable. Specifically, in 1981 I shall contribute, to the best of my knowledge and ability, to the achievement of a good constitutional revision, which the country needs so badly and on which our future so greatly depends.

2909
CSO: 3101

SDP STRATEGY TO USE ECONOMIC ISSUES FAILS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 18 Dec 80 p 2

[Commentary by Ola Gummesson]

[Text] It is sometimes said that Sweden cannot be governed in opposition to the labor movement. A functioning government must have the Social Democrats as its base.

What the Social Democrats are dreaming of is certainly that that theory will be borne out by reality--that cooperation within the government will degenerate into a permanent fight in public view and that the Falldin government will show itself incapable of overcoming Sweden's economic problems.

To all appearances, the Social Democrats now have no interest in seeing the government fall before its term is up. It is too late to take over. Heading the government would be a disadvantage and would interfere with concentration in preparation for the regular election in 1982.

It is therefore best for the government to remain as it is, for the disintegration to go on, for the conflicts to grow more serious so that a new three-party coalition will appear to be a hopeless alternative, and for the economic crisis to worsen (as a combined result of the government's lack of vigor and "impossible" wage demands). That is how the Social Democrats see things today.

As a result, they themselves can sit on the sidelines and watch the show, renounce all responsibility for the policy being pursued, and push the idea that the Social Democrats are the only party capable of running a government. In that way, the election in 1982 should be a shoo-in for them.

And when the change in government has become a fact, the Social Democrats will pursue a tough policy of restraints on the economy with the excuse that the nonsocialist governments have driven the economy into the ground and that putting it back on a sound footing is an unavoidable necessity.

In that situation, the Social Democrats will resume their role as a party undergirding the state--a party which recognizes its responsibility for the nation's future and therefore does not hesitate to adopt unpopular measures to achieve its goal.

The Social Democratic policy will be carried out and prove successful, and the party will then reap the fruits of having led Sweden out of the crisis.

That must be an approximate description of how the Social Democratic scenario looks at present.

But there are two buts. First of all, the policy of the Social Democrats in opposition has shown unmistakable signs of opportunism. Their policy in opposition has not been adapted to reality and would not have solved the country's problems. If anything, it would have made them worse.

The fact that the Social Democrats could not recapture power in 1979 was a clear sign that the voters' confidence in the party was wavering. The policy of discontent did not do the job.

In principle, the policy pursued by the Social Democrats since the 1979 election has not differed from the one with which they lost the election. If anything, its emptiness has been accentuated, while at the same time the impression of capriciousness has increased. Think, for example, of the passing fancy the Social Democrats had for protectionism, which seems to be already dead and buried.

In the second place, the Falldin government continues to hold its fate in its own hands, at least to some extent.

If the government will make up its mind to push aside certain issues dividing the parties in order to concentrate instead on the economic problems that must be solved at any cost, it can still reach a turning point during the remainder of its term. In other words, it should immediately take those steps which are necessary and which sooner or later are going to be taken in any case.

The chief obstacle to such a policy is psychological in nature. Cooperation in the government has favored the Conservatives and done the opposite for the two parties in the center. From the standpoint of the center, there is the danger that a tough policy of economic reorganization will continue to favor the Conservatives at the expense of the parties in the center.

The parties in the center are constantly being reminded by the Social Democrats that they are forced to accept the Conservative policy. They are understandably sensitive to that campaign, not least because it contains a kernel of truth.

The policy that must be pursued in order for us to overcome the crisis lies closer to the traditional policy of the Conservatives than it does to that of the parties in the center. At any rate, Conservative voters find it more digestible than voters in the center do.

On the other hand, awareness of the crisis has increased and has now taken hold of many people outside the Conservative ranks. That is a circumstance which the parties in the center ought to bear in mind today purely out of an instinct for self-preservation. An awareness of the crisis exists, and the Social Democrats will exploit that awareness if, in the end, it is they who get the job of attacking the economic problems.

Side by side with the psychologically conditioned difficulties involved in uniting the government in an energetic economic policy, there also exist other obstacles.

It is enough to recall that a new and troublesome round of collective bargaining is near. How "political" will it be, and what political complications will it give rise to?

The path is strewn with thorns, but one thing is certain. The Social Democratic strategy has a chance of succeeding--especially if the government chooses to prepare the ground for it.

11798
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PAPER COMMENTS ON INDUSTRY COUNCIL FORECAST

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 19 Dec 80 p 2

[Editorial: "After the Gang of Four"]

[Text] The economic forecast released yesterday by the Federation of Swedish Industries is the gloomiest of any published this fall. One reason is that since its forecast brings up the rear, it could use economic data both in Sweden and abroad that are pointing increasingly downward.

According to the federation's economists, we can expect the gross national product to drop by just under 1 percent in 1981, while industrial production and private consumption will probably drop by about 2 percent, and industrial investment should decline by about 5 percent. Exports are expected to decline by about 2 percent.

The concise report by the Federation of Swedish Industries sheds admirable light on the way in which wage and income developments during 1980 seriously worsened Sweden's economic situation.

It is calculated that disposable household income in 1980 will increase by between 14 and 15 percent. That is the largest increase since the "record years" of 1974 and 1975. Such a development, which is poorly suited to Sweden's economic situation, is due mainly to the wage agreements and to increases in government income transfers to households.

There are two different ways in which the latest wage negotiation has harmed Swedish exports in the most serious manner.

One is the fact that as a result of last spring's labor conflicts, Sweden lost some share of the market not only temporarily but also more permanently.

The other is that as a result of the wage increases, labor costs per unit produced in 1980 have risen considerably more in Sweden than in the most important of our competitor countries.

If we look at the way in which relative export prices on manufactured goods have developed, we can see that the effect of the 1977 devaluations has now been completely eaten up. In 1981 we will be back in the unfavorable competitive situation that we were in at the start of 1977.

Moreover, the calculation by the Federation of Swedish Industries is based on a freeze on contract wages during 1981. But because of the so-called overhang from the 1980 agreements, wage drift, and some form of compensation for salaried employees to make up for that, the calculations nevertheless result in a 6-percent increase in the wage package. So even though so much restrictiveness was assumed in the wage talks, our competitive position will probably be weakened even further in 1981 in comparison with most West European countries.

Other predictions by the Federation of Swedish Industries are also gloomy: for example, an inflation rate of over 10 percent and unemployment totaling over 4 percent at the end of 1981.

Any attempt to prevent difficulties during the 1981 recession through a traditional economic policy designed to stimulate demand would only make the pain worse. Two other paths must be followed before developments can be made to improve. One consists of holding down the cost of doing business. The other consists of stimulating the free operation of productive forces in society.

The wage explosion in this year's collective bargaining came from the public sector of the economy. The leaders of the gang of four--Hellers, Marjasin, Nicklasson, and Rosengren--have in recent months been supplied with a full and varied basis on which to ponder their evil deeds. But in cases such as these, all economic teaching should probably be thrown out. It must, therefore, be up to the government to see to it, with a determination as hard as iron, that the public sector of the economy is held in check in the new round of collective bargaining.

But not even a wage freeze secured by wage contracts is enough to make industry and commerce competitive again. Other steps will also be necessary in 1981: either a sharp devaluation or a considerable reduction in the burden of taxes and other contributions borne by business.

To the wage earners, this may seem a bitter pill, but it must be swallowed. The reason is that if Swedish industry is unable to compete successfully on the export market, the effect on the country's wage earners will be considerably worse than that caused by a temporary decline in living standards.

Along with improving the cost situation, it is equally important to set the productive forces free and create a climate in Sweden that is friendly to business. Such measures must extend over a wide area. It is urgent that the marginal tax rates be reduced drastically. The market economy must be restored in various areas.

What is needed, in other words, is a business policy completely different than the one bearing Nils G. Asling's signature.

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BRIEFS

MILITARY HELICOPTER FORCES REORGANIZATION--The government has decided that Armed Forces Supreme Commander Lennart Ljung is to continue his investigation to determine how military helicopters should be organized. Minister of Defense Eric Kronmark says that the supreme commander must aim at closer coordination. This means that the long drawn-out helicopter issue, which has been under study since 1971, has still not been resolved. For the time being, Navy Commander in Chief Per Rudberg will continue to head the provisional organization that exists for air force and navy helicopters. The government wants basic training, maintenance, and repair functions coordinated in all three service branches in the future in order to reduce costs. The supreme commander is to submit his proposal on 1 December 1981 and at the same time state his opinion as to how the procurement of new helicopters should be coordinated. The government also decided on Thursday that the Karlskrona Shipyard can begin project work on two minehunting vessels of plastic. A definite order for the two vessels, to a value of over 100 million kronor, will be considered as early as this winter. Part of the money will come from shipyard subsidies to facilitate development in the area of plastics technology. The navy commander in chief had plans at one time to procure nine minehunters, but was forced by lack of funds to delay that order. The government also decided to establish a new military organization in the Gothenburg West Coast Military Command. It will comprise KA-4 [4th Coast Artillery Regiment], the Gothenburg Coast Artillery Defense District, the Western Naval Base, the 32d Military Subdistrict, and the naval shipyard. The commanding officer will be Rear Adm Bengt Rasin, seconded by Brig Gen Thorbjorn Ottosson. Two hundred jobs will disappear as a result of that consolidation. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 19 Dec 80 p 19] 11798

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